The Privacy of the Public Schools by Suski, Emily
Maryland Law Review
Volume 77 | Issue 2 Article 5
The Privacy of the Public Schools
Emily Suski
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Education Law Commons, Fourteenth Amendment Commons, and the Torts
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
77 Md. L. Rev. 427 (2018)
  
427 
THE PRIVACY OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
EMILY SUSKI* 
 This Article compares the liability of the public schools with that 
of families for harms to children in their care.  Families serve as 
an apt vehicle for comparative analysis because families’ and 
schools’ responsibilities for children overlap substantially.  De-
spite these overlapping responsibilities, however, the law allows 
schools to evade liability for harms to children and penalizes fam-
ilies for the same or similar harms. 
 Drawing on feminist theory on privacy and the public/private di-
vide, this Article argues that the limits of public school liability 
mean they have privacy.  Feminist theorists identify privacy as 
freedom from regulation and intrusion into decision-making.  Pub-
lic schools enjoy privacy in this sense because when they allow or 
cause harm to children, they are largely not held legally responsi-
ble.  In the context of harms to children, therefore, the public/pri-
vate divide is inverted. 
 Recognizing this public school privacy has significance in three 
ways.  First, it highlights how the law privileges school authority 
over the rights of children.  Second, recognizing public schools’ 
privacy allows for its deconstruction.  Third, once deconstructed, 
elements of this privacy justify a theoretical argument that the 
Fourteenth Amendment imposes a duty on schools to protect chil-
dren, and that children have a corollary right to be free from harm 
in school. 
INTRODUCTION 
If time is the measure of responsibility, then the institutions with the 
most responsibility for children are families and schools.  Yet, when children 
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are harmed in their care, the law holds schools far less responsible than fam-
ilies.  Two recent cases illustrate this difference.  In one, In re L.Z.,1 a mother 
lost custody of her son for injuries inflicted by his aunt.2  Those injuries in-
cluded bruises to his cheeks due to having an “adult planting a thumb in one 
cheek [and her other fingers on the other cheek] and squeezing the child’s 
face between the thumb and fingers.”3  In the other, Domingo v. Kowalski,4 a 
child was subjected to virtually identical treatment.5  There, though, the adult 
inflicting the injury was a school teacher, and the court excused the force as 
“minimal,”6 “related to a legitimate pedagogical purpose,”7 and “resulting in 
no demonstrated serious injury.”8  As a result, the school faced no responsi-
bility for the harm to the child.9 
These cases reflect an inversion of the public/private binary.10  The pub-
lic/private binary has been extensively explored in feminist literature.11  
                                                          
 1.  111 A.3d 1164 (Pa. 2015). 
 2.  Id. at 1186.  
 3.  Id. at 1167. 
 4.  810 F.3d 403 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 5.  Id. at 407–08. 
 6.  Id. at 414. 
 7.  Id. at 412. 
 8.  Id. at 416.  As reflected by the number of cases heard in the federal courts of appeals alone, 
harm to children in school happens with some degree of frequency, not to mention claims heard in 
federal district and state courts about such harms.  Indeed, at least seven federal courts of appeals 
have considered cases involving harms to children to decide just the question of whether the Four-
teenth Amendment imposes a duty of care for students on schools.  See infra note 393 and accom-
panying text. 
 9.  Domingo, 810 F.3d at 416.  The comparison also raises the question of whether the child 
welfare system too easily imposes liability on families and what should be done about that.  Resolv-
ing that question is beyond the scope of this Article and indeed has been thoughtfully explored by 
other scholars.  See, e.g., Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Storming the Castle to Save the Children: 
The Ironic Costs of a Child Welfare Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
413 (2005); Josh Gupta-Kagan, Toward a Public Health Legal Structure for Child Welfare, 92 NEB. 
L. REV. 897, 916 (2014). 
 10.  For example, and perhaps most prominently, Catharine MacKinnon has critiqued the pub-
lic/private divide and notions of privacy generally, and family privacy in particular, as the marker 
of women’s subordination and oppression.  CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST 
THEORY OF THE STATE 191–92 (1989); see also Frances Olsen, Constitutional Law: Feminist Cri-
tiques of the Public/Private Distinction, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 319, 322–23 (1993) (exploring 
meanings of “public” and “private” and assessing the criticisms of them).  Anne C. Dailey has also 
described the ways regulation of the family flout notions of family privacy.  Anne C. Dailey, Con-
stitutional Privacy and the Just Family, 67 TUL. L. REV. 955, 997–99 (1993).  Martha Albertson 
Fineman has critiqued the concept of family privacy as one that relegates caretaking, which she sees 
as a collective responsibility to a particular, and at least sometimes problematic, sphere.  MARTHA 
ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 292, 299 (2004).  As 
a result of this work and the work of others, Katharine Bartlett describes “[f]eminist successes in 
achieving reform [particularly] in the area [of domestic violence as] quite impressive.”  Katharine 
T. Bartlett, Feminism and Family Law, 33 FAM. L.Q. 475, 495 (1999).  
 11.  Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
835, 835 (1985) (arguing that the myth of “the private family is an incoherent ideal and that the 
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There, “public” is identified as that which is regulated, particularly by the 
government.12  “Private” is the opposite.13  It is unregulated and free from 
intrusion.14  In that sense, families have long been considered private.15  Ab-
sent maltreatment, families have had a great deal of freedom to care for chil-
dren as they see fit.16  Indeed, caretaking itself has been deemed private in 
that it has been seen as properly the role of families and not the state.17  Fam-
ilies, thus, undertake private tasks and have privacy in doing so.  In contrast, 
public schools have understandably been considered wholly public.  They are 
not just regulated by the state.18  They are creatures of it.19 
At the same time, though, the notion that there is a stark, impregnable 
divide between the public and private spheres has been exposed as false, par-
ticularly with respect to the family.20  Families are very much regulated.21  
Mandatory school attendance laws require that families send their children to 
school.22  Family leave laws determine how much time employees can take 
away from work to care for family members.23  These and other laws, there-
fore, demonstrate that families’ authority over the care of children is not un-
fettered.  What has not yet been explored, however, is the extent to which the 
public/private binary founders because public entities have some degree of 
privacy.24  This Article explores that question with respect to the public 
schools. 
                                                          
rhetoric of nonintervention is more harmful than helpful”); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence 
of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973, 974, 984–86 (1991) (exploring the problems of notions of pri-
vacy, including its contribution to the oppression of women, and also the value in affirmative no-
tions of privacy). 
 12.  See infra notes 318–321 and accompanying text. 
 13.  See infra notes 318–323 and accompanying text. 
 14.  See infra notes 318–323 and accompanying text. 
 15.  See infra notes 327–332 and accompanying text. 
 16.  MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT, AND AMERICA’S 
POLITICAL IDEALS 120 (2010) (“[I]t is families, not the state, who are responsible for safeguarding 
children’s welfare.”).  
 17.  Id.; see infra notes 331–332 and accompanying text. 
 18.  See infra notes 378–380 and accompanying text. 
 19.  See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (identifying boards of 
education as “creatures” of the state); see also Comm. for Educ. Equal. v. State, 878 S.W.2d 446, 
457–58 (Mo. 1994) (en banc) (“School districts are creatures of state law established to carry out 
governmental functions . . . .”). 
 20.  As Katharine Bartlett writes, “[f]eminism’s principal contribution to the law of the family 
in the United States has been to open up that institution to critical scrutiny and question the justice 
of a legal regime that has permitted, even reinforced, the subordination of some family members to 
others.”  Bartlett, supra note 10, at 475. 
 21.  See infra notes 347–348 and accompanying text. 
 22.  See infra note 349 and accompanying text. 
 23.  See infra note 350 and accompanying text. 
 24.  One particularly notable exception to the public nature of public institutions is the state 
secrets privilege and other information held by the government but shielded from public knowledge 
out of national security and other concerns.  For example, in United States v. Reynolds, the Supreme 
 430 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 77:427 
 
This Article argues that the public/private binary fails with respect to 
the public schools.  In the context of responsibility for harm to children, the 
public schools have privacy—more than even the family—and the privacy is 
evidenced in two primary ways.  First, public schools do the caretaking work 
traditionally relegated to the private sphere.  For reasons both practical and 
legal, public schools and families share nearly identical caretaking responsi-
bilities over children.25  Children—particularly young children—cannot en-
sure their own safety or impose their own discipline.  They need families and, 
when they are in school, schools to do that for them.  The law has recognized 
this point.26  Indeed, the Supreme Court has identified these roles for both 
families and schools, and it has used them to justify its decisions.27  The Court 
has said that both families and schools educate students for citizenship, so-
cialize them to morals and values, discipline them, and keep them safe.28  Be-
cause these responsibilities have traditionally been deemed primarily the 
function of the family and not the state, they have been considered private.29  
Schools, therefore, have a role to play in carrying out activities traditionally 
deemed private. 
Second, public schools have privacy because the law limits their liabil-
ity when children are harmed in their care.  Indeed, the law holds the public 
schools less responsible than the family for such harms.  Although child 
abuse and neglect laws have created a system for imposing responsibility on 
the family when children are harmed, no such system exists for the schools.30  
Instead, when children suffer harms in school, they face an uphill battle to 
hold the school responsible.  Children injured in school could theoretically 
make out a substantive due process claim or a Title IX harassment claim, to 
                                                          
Court concluded that the United States properly invoked its state secrets privilege in response to a 
request for an accident report by three widows whose husbands had died as the result of a military 
aircraft crash.  345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953).  The federal Freedom of Information Act serves as another 
example.  It has nine enumerated categories of information that are exempt from disclosure.  5 
U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012).  Even in these examples, though, privacy is not the conceptualization ap-
plied to withholding that information from the public.  Instead, the information is treated as excep-
tional—secret, even—but not private. 
 25.  See infra Part I.C. 
 26.  See infra Part I.B. 
 27.  See infra Part I.B. 
 28.  See infra Part I.B. 
 29.  To be sure, the Supreme Court never calls the work of schools “caretaking” or “private.”  
It nonetheless is such in the sense that it is the work generally relegated to the private sphere.  So, 
even when the Supreme Court has found the state to have some caretaking obligation, it has been 
the exception to the norm.  It has been justified only when the state has prevented individuals from 
caring for themselves, as in the case of prison inmates or persons involuntarily committed to mental 
health facilities.  See infra notes 382–383 and accompanying text.  
 30.  See infra Part III.B. 
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name two.  Those claims, however, are not easy to establish.31  The threshold 
legal standards and the facts that must be alleged to support them serve as 
high bars to success.32  The public schools, therefore, enjoy privacy in the 
sense that they enjoy freedom from regulation or intrusion into decisionmak-
ing that allows or causes harm to children.33 
This comparison between the child welfare system and claims against 
schools is made not to suggest that a child-welfare-like system be developed 
for adjudicating claims of harm to children in school.  That such a system 
exists for claims against the family when claims against the public schools 
are fraught with barriers to success, however, does reflect the relative will-
ingness of the legal system to hold these two institutions responsible for 
harms to children.  The law stands far more ready to hold the family respon-
sible for harms to children than schools. 
Exposing this privacy of the public schools has value in three ways.  
First, it highlights how the law privileges school authority over children’s 
rights and therefore leaves children vulnerable to harm.34  Second, recogni-
tion of public schools’ privacy allows for its deconstruction.35  Third, once 
deconstructed, elements of this privacy support a theoretical argument that 
the Fourteenth Amendment imposes a duty on schools to protect children.36  
This Article, therefore, contributes to the scholarly discourse on public school 
liability and children’s rights by offering a way to hold schools more account-
able for harms to children. 
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I explains more fully how, un-
der the jurisprudence touching on the roles of the family and the public 
schools, the roles of both institutions are markedly similar and can be 
summed up as caretaking roles.37  While these similarities might suggest that 
                                                          
 31.  A child abuse case against an individual school staff member for harms to a child might 
succeed, but a claim against the public school itself is far more challenging to establish.  For exam-
ple, in T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. School Board of Seminole County, a child abused by his teacher in 
school lodged an unsuccessful claim against the public schools to hold them accountable for his 
harms, but the teacher was separately charged with and found guilty of criminal child abuse.  610 
F.3d 588, 597 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 32.  See infra Part III.B–C. 
 33.  This is not to say that public schools are not regulated at all and are therefore totally private.  
They are regulated in numerous ways, just largely not when it comes to harms to children in school.  
See infra notes 364–367 and accompanying text. 
 34.  See infra Part III.B.2. 
 35.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 36.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 37.  Martha Fineman discusses this kind of caretaking more broadly as meeting dependency 
needs, or the needs of those “not autonomous and independent” in arguing that there is a collective 
responsibility for meeting those needs.  FINEMAN, supra note 10, at xiii.  Maxine Eichner has also 
argued the state should play a greater role in supporting caretaking, though she alternately calls 
these needs caretaking and dependency needs.  EICHNER, supra note 16, at 9–10. 
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the two institutions share similar degrees of responsibility for harms to chil-
dren in their care, Part II demonstrates that is not the case.  In analyzing child 
welfare laws and cases, it describes the ease with which responsibility is im-
posed on families for harms to children.  It then compares this level of re-
sponsibility to that of the public schools by discussing some of the principal 
claims a child could make against the public schools for harms suffered in 
school.  This discussion shows how limited public school responsibility is.  
Part III argues that this limited responsibility means that public schools have 
privacy.  It first mines feminist theory on the concept of privacy to explain 
how it operates generally.  It then applies these concepts of privacy to the 
public schools to show how they enjoy it to a greater degree than families.38  
The consequence of this privacy is that school authority is privileged over 
student rights.  Finally, Part IV contends that dismantling the myth that public 
schools are fully public offers a way to correct the privileging of school au-
thority over children’s rights.  Deconstructing public schools’ privacy into its 
component parts reveals how some aspects of that privacy support a theoret-
ical argument for the development of a school’s constitutional duty to protect 
children from harm and an affirmative right of children to be free from that 
harm in school.  Part V also offers a framework for courts to consider in 
evaluating this duty and this right. 
I.  THE OVERLAPPING ROLES OF THE FAMILY AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
The two institutions with the greatest responsibility for the care of chil-
dren over the course of their childhoods are families and schools.39  In part 
                                                          
 38.  This point gives rise to a separate, but closely related, question about why schools have 
less responsibility than families for harms to children.  Exploring this question will be the work of 
a subsequent article.  Both that article and this one fit within the framework of other research pro-
jects this Author has completed exploring the boundaries of public school authority and responsi-
bility.  See generally Emily Suski, A First Amendment Deference Approach to Reforming Anti-
Bullying Laws, 77 LA. L. REV. 701 (2017); Emily F. Suski, Beyond the Schoolhouse Gates: The 
Unprecedented Expansion of School Surveillance Authority Under Cyberbullying Laws, 65 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 63 (2014) [hereinafter Suski, Beyond the Schoolhouse Gates]; Emily F. Suski, 
Dark Sarcasm in the Classroom: The Failure of the Courts to Recognize Students’ Severe Emotional 
Harm as Unconstitutional, 62 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 125 (2014) [hereinafter Suski, Dark Sarcasm]. 
 39.  Students generally spend much of the day, five days per week for nine or more months of 
the year, in school.  All states require children attend school, and according to the Center for Public 
Education, most states require students attend school for between 170 and 180 days per year for 900 
to 1000 hours of instruction.  Jim Hull & Mandy Newport, Time in School: How Does the U.S. 
Compare?, CTR. FOR PUB. EDUC. (Dec. 2011), http://www.centerforpubliceducation.org/Main-
Menu/Organizing-a-school/Time-in-school-How-does-the-US-compare; Table 5.1. Compulsory 
School Attendance Laws, Minimum and Maximum Age Limits for Required Free Education, by 
State: 2015, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., http://nces.ed.gov/programs/statereform/tab5_1.asp 
(last visited Jan 21, 2018) [hereinafter Table 5.1].  Of course there are interim places where children 
also spend much of the day.  As Laura Rosenbury has argued, the law needs to recognize these 
spaces and the implications of children spending time there as well.  Laura A. Rosenbury, Between 
Home and School, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 833, 834 (2007). 
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perhaps reflecting this, when courts have identified the roles of families and 
the public schools with respect to children, they are remarkably similar.  They 
include providing children with an education, dispensing discipline, and en-
suring their safety.40  These roles, therefore, boil down to caretaking, or meet-
ing the needs of children that children cannot meet on their own.41 
While courts all over the country, from local state courts to federal 
courts, have undoubtedly found cause to address the roles of the family and 
the public schools with respect to children, the review that follows focuses 
on the Supreme Court’s discussions on that topic.  It does so in part for brev-
ity and in part because the Supreme Court’s influence on this topic, as with 
any other, is profound.  Although the Court’s statements on the roles of fam-
ilies and schools are made by way of justifying and explaining its decisions, 
they are by no means mandates.42  They are nonetheless significant because 
they reflect the Court’s understandings and expectations, as well as society’s 
more generally.  As such, the Court has found some of the roles to be consti-
tutionally protected.43 
A.  The Family’s Roles with Respect to Children 
When the Supreme Court has addressed the role of the family with re-
spect to children, it generally is assessing state regulations affecting and lim-
iting family decision-making in realms such as child education, childcare, 
and child upbringing.  In sum, this jurisprudence reveals that the Supreme 
Court understands families’ roles to include providing education for their 
children, helping them to develop moral standards, teaching them to under-
stand and embrace the basic principles of citizenship, and caring for and dis-
ciplining them.44  While more is surely expected of families, the legal system 
understands families to carry out these duties at the very least.45  Calling these 
                                                          
 40.  See infra Part II.B. 
 41.  As already noted, Martha Fineman would call these needs “dependency needs” while Max-
ine Eichner primarily calls them “caretaking.”  See supra note 37, and accompanying text.  This 
Article calls them caretaking, in part, because the description so aptly fits the work. 
 42.  While the Supreme Court does not mandate that families perform any of these roles, states 
do.  Parents can be prosecuted for neglect for doing things like failing to care for their children and 
failing to send them to school.  See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972) (noting that 
while “[t]here is no doubt as to the power of a State . . . to impose reasonable regulations for the 
control and duration of basic education” and thus override a parent’s generalized objection to it, the 
objection in this case was protected by the First Amendment because it was grounded in specific 
religious bases). 
 43.  See infra Part II.A.1. 
 44.  See infra notes 50–65 and accompanying text. 
 45.  In Prince v. Massachusetts, for example, the Court noted that “[i]t is cardinal with us that 
the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and 
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”  321 U.S. 158, 
166 (1944) (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)).  As much as the Court then 
identifies some obligations of families in order to decide this proper line between state regulations 
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family roles “roles” or “duties,” though, understates the matter.  In most 
cases, the Court not only identifies these roles and duties but also states that 
they are liberty interests.46  As such, they are of course more than mere tasks 
the families have responsibility for carrying out, as the terms “role” or “duty” 
might suggest.  They also carry heightened doctrinal protections.47 
1.  The Family’s Role in Educating Children and Its “Additional 
Obligations” 
In a pair of cases decided nearly a century ago but just two years apart, 
the Supreme Court identified families as having a significant role in the edu-
cation of children.  This role includes both a voice in determining the sub-
stance and the process of children’s education.  In Meyer v. Nebraska,48 the 
Court discussed the family’s role in deciding the substance of children’s ed-
ucation in order to resolve whether a Nebraska state law that prohibited the 
teaching in schools of any language other than English before ninth grade 
violated parents’ and teachers’ Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests.49  In 
finding those liberty interests violated, the Court said that they include the 
right not only of the teacher to teach but also the “right of parents to engage 
[the child].”50  The Court said that “it is the natural duty of the parent to give 
[their] children education” as well as to “control the education of their 
own.”51  While this right of control is not unlimited, the Court nonetheless 
clearly identifies that families have a role in and a right to determine the sub-
stance—here, the teaching of German—of a child’s education.52 
Two years later, the Supreme Court decided Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters,53 which gave it cause to consider the family’s role in making decisions 
about the process by which children receive their education.54  In Pierce, the 
                                                          
and family decisionmaking regarding children, it also acknowledges what may seem obvious: that 
parents have comprehensive caretaking responsibilities regarding their children and any roles the 
Court identifies, then, are but a subset of those comprehensive caretaking responsibilities.  Id. at 
166–67. 
 46.  See infra Part II.C. 
 47.  An exception among the cases cited here in which parents’ responsibilities do not imbue 
them with heightened protection is Prince v. Massachusetts.  There, the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged the significance of parents’ caretaking responsibilities but, nonetheless, found the parent’s 
Fourteenth Amendment rights had not been violated when the state infringed upon her decision-
making regarding her children in the form of prosecution for violating child labor laws.  321 U.S. 
at 166–67.  
 48.  262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 49.  Id. at 398–99.  
 50.  Id. at 400. 
 51.  Id. at 400–01. 
 52.  Id. at 401. 
 53.  268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 54.  Id. at 532.  
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Court heard a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to an Oregon statute that 
required parents to send their children to public school without any relevant 
exception for private or parochial schools.55  To reach its conclusion that the 
statute violated the parents’ liberty interests, the Court reiterated the principle 
in Meyer that parents’ liberty rights include the right to “direct the upbringing 
and education of children under their control.”56  Because the rights in Pierce 
involved parents’ decisions over how, or the process by which, children re-
ceive an education, Pierce represents the idea that parents’ liberty interests 
in the control of their children’s education includes some control over the 
process by which they get that education.  In addition, the Pierce decision 
identifies that the parents’ role with respect to their children involves more 
than just controlling their education.  The Court said in Pierce that parents 
“have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare [their 
children] for additional obligations[,]” though it did not elaborate on what 
those additional obligations are.57 
2.  The Family’s Role in the Inculcation of Moral Standards, 
Religious Beliefs, and Elements of Good Citizenship 
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,58 the Court identified some of those “additional 
obligations.”59  Yoder involved the question of whether the State of Wiscon-
sin could require Amish children to attend school in violation of their reli-
gious beliefs.60  Three Amish parents challenged the law and their resulting 
criminal convictions.61  In upholding the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s deci-
sion to overturn the convictions based on the First Amendment, the Supreme 
Court noted that parents have an interest and a role in directing the upbringing 
of their children, including their religious upbringing.62  The Court also cited 
Pierce’s identification of “additional obligations” parents have in raising 
children.63  It said that these “additional obligations” “must be read to include 
the inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good 
citizenship.”64  In order to teach these beliefs and standards of citizenship, 
families can opt to not send their children to school—at least when doing so 
                                                          
 55.  Id. at 530.  The Court noted that the issue in the case was not whether the state has the 
power to require that children be educated by attendance at some school.  Id. at 534.  The question 
instead was whether the state could preclude attendance at non-public schools.  Id. 
 56.  Id. at 534–35. 
 57.  Id. at 535. 
 58.  406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 59.  Id. at 233 (quoting Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925)). 
 60.  Id. at 207. 
 61.  Id. at 208–09. 
 62.  Id. at 213–14. 
 63.  Id. at 233 (quoting Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–35). 
 64.  Id. 
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would “contravene[] the basic religious tenets and practices” of their reli-
gious beliefs.65 
3.  The Family’s Caretaking and Disciplinary Roles 
Finally, in Prince v. Massachusetts66 and again in later cases like San-
tosky v. Kramer,67 the Court lays out two roles for families implied in earlier 
cases: caretaking and disciplinary roles. Unlike Meyer, Pierce, and Yoder, 
neither Prince nor Santosky addressed a regulation regarding the education 
of children.  Prince involved a challenge by Sarah Prince to a law prohibiting 
children under certain ages from working.68  Sarah Prince was convicted of 
violating the statute when she allowed her niece, over whom she had custody, 
to distribute religious magazines on the street.69  She appealed her conviction 
and argued that it violated her Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests.70  Alt-
hough the Supreme Court upheld the conviction, it stated: “It is cardinal with 
us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the par-
ents . . . .”71  Thus, in Prince, the Court explicitly identified the parents’ care-
taking role over their children. 
Santosky raised the question of the proper standard of proof to be used 
when terminating parents’ rights to their children based on allegations of 
abuse or neglect.72  The petitioners in the case, John Santosky II and Annie 
Santosky, were the parents of two children, Tina and John III, who were re-
moved from their parents’ care based on allegations of neglect.73  A third 
child, Jed, born later, was also removed from the home.74  Finding by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the Santoskys were, among other things, “in-
capable, even with public assistance, of planning for the future of their chil-
dren,” the Ulster County, New York Family Court terminated their parental 
rights.75  The Santoskys challenged that holding, arguing that the standard of 
proof violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights.76  The Supreme Court 
                                                          
 65.  Id. at 218. 
 66.  321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
 67.  455 U.S. 745 (1982). 
 68.  321 U.S. at 160–61. 
 69.  Id. at 161–62.  Sarah Prince also had two sons, and they were with her and her niece dis-
tributing religious materials on the street.  Id. at 159.  Prince’s convictions under Massachusetts’s 
child labor laws, however, only involved the work done by her niece.  Id. at 159–60. 
 70.  Id. at 159–60.  
 71.  Id. at 166. 
 72.  455 U.S. at 747–48. 
 73.  Id. at 751. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. at 752. 
 76.  Id. 
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agreed.77  It held that “use of a ‘fair preponderance of the evidence’ standard 
in such [termination of parental rights] proceedings is inconsistent with due 
process.”78  To reach this conclusion, the Court reiterated the fundamental 
liberty interest of parents in the “care, custody, and management” of their 
children.79  In doing so, it reaffirmed the role of the family as caretakers and 
custodians of children.80  By naming the “management” of children as among 
these roles, it also suggested that families’ responsibilities include disciplin-
ing their children.81  Indeed, their interest in the care and management, or 
discipline, of their children is so strong that it justifies a higher standard of 
proof than a preponderance of the evidence before their rights to their chil-
dren can be taken away.82 
B.  The Public Schools’ Roles with Respect to Children 
Just as the Supreme Court has identified some of the roles of families 
with respect to children, so too has it identified the roles of the public schools.  
It identified these roles while determining the proper limits of schools’ au-
thority.  With the exception of infusing children with religious beliefs, the 
roles of the public schools’ overlap substantially with those of families. 
Before describing these roles, it is worth addressing one potentially nag-
ging point.  That is, although the Supreme Court has identified these roles for 
schools, it does not require that they fulfill them.  Consequently, one could 
                                                          
 77.  Id. at 758. 
 78.  Id. (quoting Family Court Act, N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 622 (McKinney, 1975 & supp. 1981–
1982)). 
 79.  Id. at 753. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id.  The term “management” implicitly encompasses the authority and right of parents to 
discipline their children.  Indeed, courts have recognized parents’ right to discipline their children.  
See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 593 (1975) (“School discipline, like parental discipline, is 
an integral and important part of training our children to be good citizens—to be better citizens.”) 
(Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 524 
(1969) (Black, J., dissenting)); Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 523 (7th Cir. 2003) (the fundamental 
right of parents to discipline their children includes the right to delegate that right). 
 82.  Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753, 758.  More specifically, the Court stated,  
[t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management 
of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or 
have lost temporary custody of their child to the State. . . .If anything, persons faced with 
forced dissolution of their parental rights have a more critical need for procedural protec-
tions than do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs.   
Id. at 753.  Further, the Court continued, 
In parental rights termination proceedings, the private interest affected is commanding; 
the risk of error from using a preponderance standard is substantial; and the countervail-
ing governmental interest favoring that standard is comparatively slight . . .[such] that 
use of a “fair preponderance of the evidence” standard in such proceedings is inconsistent 
with due process. 
Id. at 758. 
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perhaps argue that these identified roles have little relevance to legal analysis 
because they are not doctrinally mandated or protected.  Indeed, while the 
roles identified for families often hold constitutional significance because 
they fall under the ambit of protected liberty interests, the roles identified for 
schools do not.83  However, this argument fails to acknowledge that these 
roles identified for schools and families serve as the rationales in the Court’s 
decision-making.  The Court’s statements about schools’ roles, like families’ 
roles, form the basis, sometimes the sole basis, for its decisions.  Thus, they 
are hardly irrelevant.  Moreover, the Court not only uses the roles to justify 
its decisions, but it also treats them as self-evident and not even warranting a 
citation.  For example, it did both, in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fra-
ser84 when it said, without citation, “schools must teach by example the 
shared values of a civilized social order” to support its conclusion regarding 
the school’s suppression of student speech.85  These roles thus serve a signif-
icant function in the development of doctrine and for that reason, among oth-
ers, merit exploration and analysis. 
1.  The Public Schools’ Role in Educating Students and Preparing 
Them for Citizenship 
In a number of cases, the Supreme Court has identified the public 
schools’ role to include educating students so they are prepared for citizen-
ship and participation in the democracy.  Sometimes that role supports the 
protection of students’ constitutional rights in school, and sometimes it does 
not.  Either way, though, the role is oft-repeated by the Court.  In West Vir-
ginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,86 for example, the Court consid-
ered the question of whether all students could be required to salute the Amer-
ican flag, including students for whom doing so would be a violation of their 
beliefs as Jehovah’s Witnesses.87  In determining that the State of West Vir-
ginia could not require the students to salute the flag in violation of their 
                                                          
 83.  See infra Part II.C. 
 84.  478 U.S. 675 (1986).   
 85.  Id. at 683.  The Court has done the same thing with respect to families’ roles.  In Wisconsin 
v. Yoder, the Court coupled parents’ roles with their First Amendment interests to justify excepting 
the parents in question from otherwise “reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic 
education.”  406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972).  It said, “[t]he duty to prepare the child for ‘additional obli-
gations,’ referred to by the Court, must be read to include the inculcation of moral standards, reli-
gious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship.”  Id. at 233 (quoting Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 
268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925)).  
 86.  319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 87.  Id. at 628–29.  The consequence for failing to salute the flag was extreme: expulsion.  What 
is more, not only did schools have to expel students for failing to salute the flag, but when they did 
not attend school as a result of that very expulsion, the students and their parents could be prosecuted 
for delinquency.  Id. at 629. 
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religious beliefs, the Court noted that schools perform many “important, del-
icate, and highly discretionary functions,” but ultimately, what they are doing 
is “educating the young for citizenship.”88  For that reason, the Court stated 
that students’ constitutional rights must be “scrupulous[ly] protect[ed],” in-
cluding their First Amendment rights.89 
Again in other First Amendment cases, the Supreme Court has reiterated 
that schools are educating students for citizenship.  In Ambach v. Norwich,90 
the Court reasoned that a school’s role is to prepare students for citizenship, 
including by “developing students’ attitude toward government and under-
standing of the role of citizens in our society.”91  In Board of Education, Is-
land Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico,92 the Court had to 
determine whether a school board on Long Island could ban certain books 
from school libraries.93  It overturned the ban94 and again acknowledged the 
schools’ role in educating students for citizenship, and it noted that this role 
required that constitutional rights be protected so students are not taught to 
“discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.”95 
In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, the Court used the school’s 
role in educating students for citizenship as the rationale for its decision that 
a student could be suspended for making a lewd speech at school.96  In Fra-
ser, the Court stated: “The role and purpose of the American public school 
system . . . [is to] prepare pupils for citizenship . . . .”97  The Court concluded: 
“The First Amendment does not prevent the school officials from determin-
ing that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech . . . would undermine the school’s 
basic educational mission[,]”98 and that mission includes teaching students 
how to appropriately engage in the discourse expected in a democracy.99 
2.  The Public Schools’ Role in the Inculcation of Morals, Values, 
and Behavioral Norms 
The Supreme Court has not limited itself to broad statements regarding 
the public schools’ role in educating students for citizenship.  Although it has 
                                                          
 88.  Id. at 637, 642. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  441 U.S. 68 (1979). 
 91.  Id. at 78. 
 92.  457 U.S. 853 (1982). 
 93.  Id. at 855–56.  
 94.  Id. at 872. 
 95.  Id. at 864–65 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)). 
 96.  478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986). 
 97.  Id. at 681. 
 98.  Id. at 685. 
 99.  Id. at 681–82. 
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acknowledged that schools’ functions are “highly discretionary,”100 it has still 
identified, with some specificity, what it understands schools’ functions to 
involve.  In several cases, the Court has stated that schools have a role in 
teaching students morals, values, and behavioral norms. 
In at least three First Amendment cases, Ambach, Pico, and Fraser, the 
Court identifies these roles for schools.101  In Ambach, the Court said that 
schools are “a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural val-
ues . . . and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment” to support 
its conclusion that school teachers could be required to be citizens.102  In Pico, 
the Court said that schools are to “transmit community values” and they have 
an “interest in promoting respect for authority and traditional values be they 
social, moral, or political.”103  That did not mean, however, that schools could 
suppress ideas without violating the First Amendment.104 
The Court got even more specific in its pronouncements regarding 
schools’ functions in Fraser, stating schools teach “fundamental values of 
‘habits and manners of civility[,]’” and these “must, of course, include toler-
ance of divergent political and religious views . . . [and] consideration of the 
sensibilities of others.”105  It also stated that society has an interest in having 
schools teach “the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.”106  Conse-
quently, the public school was justified in the suppression of a student’s lewd 
speech.107 
The Court has also identified these roles for schools outside of its First 
Amendment cases.  In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,108 a Fourth 
Amendment case, the Court considered whether mandatory drug testing for 
student athletes violated students’ rights to be free from unreasonable 
searches.109  In deciding such searches did not violate the reasonableness re-
quirement of the Fourth Amendment, the Court quoted Fraser, saying that it 
is “the power and indeed the duty [of schools] to inculcate the habits and 
manners of civility.”110  This duty is part of the heightened degree of super-
vision schools have over students that justified the drug testing at issue.111 
                                                          
 100.  Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637.   
 101.  See supra text accompanying notes 91–99. 
 102.  441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979) (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 493 
(1954)). 
 103.  Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982) 
(quoting Brief for Petitioners at 10, Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (No. 80-243)). 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  478 U.S. at 675, 681 (1986). 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. at 685. 
 108.  515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
 109.  Id. at 648. 
 110.  Id. at 655 (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681). 
 111.  Id. 
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3.  The Public Schools’ Disciplinary Role 
As part, perhaps, of teaching these values and behavioral norms, the 
Court has also implicitly and explicitly stated that schools’ role includes dis-
ciplining students.  The Court has done so implicitly when affirming schools’ 
imposition of discipline that also constitutes the suppression of speech, as in 
Fraser.112  By affirming the imposition of discipline, the Court in essence is 
acknowledging the appropriateness of disciplinary function more generally 
by schools. 
The Court has also explicitly identified this disciplinary role for schools 
in cases like Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District113 
and Board of Education of District 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls.114  In 
Tinker, the Court’s task was to decide whether suspending students for wear-
ing black armbands to school in protest of the Vietnam War violated their 
First Amendment rights.115  Although the Court concluded that the suspen-
sions did violate the students’ First Amendment rights, the Court also repeat-
edly stated that some speech could be suppressed if it “materially and sub-
stantially disrupt[ed] the work and discipline of the school.”116  In other 
words, discipline in school is flatly identified as one of the functions of 
school; indeed, one so crucial that its disruption could justify infringement 
on students’ First Amendment rights.  In Earls, the Court was deciding 
whether a school’s drug testing requirement for all extracurricular activities 
was proper under the Fourth Amendment.117  In deciding it was, the Court 
again drew on its understanding of schools’ role.  It stated: “A student’s pri-
vacy interest is limited in a public school environment where the State is re-
sponsible for maintaining discipline . . . .”118  Whether explicit or implicit, 
though, the role is identified across cases over many decades as squarely one 
of schools’. 
4.  The Public Schools’ Custodial Role and Role in Protecting the 
Health and Safety of Children 
Finally, the Court has said that schools have both a custodial role with 
respect to children and a role in maintaining their health and safety.119  The 
Court discussed this custodial role in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton 
when it concluded that the drug testing of student athletes does not violate 
                                                          
 112.  478 U.S. at 685. 
 113.  393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 114.  536 U.S. 822 (2002). 
 115.  393 U.S. at 504–05. 
 116.  Id. at 511, 513. 
 117.  536 U.S. at 827. 
 118.  Id. at 830 (emphasis added).  
 119.  See infra notes 120–121 and accompanying text. 
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the Fourth Amendment.  The Court noted that schools’ authority over stu-
dents was not identical to that of parents, whose authority is not subject to 
constitutional strictures, but the Court nonetheless said that schools have a 
“custodial and tutelary [role], permitting a degree of supervision and control 
that could not be exercised over free adults.”120  Identifying this role then 
helped to justify the search of students at issue in the case.  More specifically, 
the Court said that the “‘reasonableness’ inquiry [required under the Fourth 
Amendment] cannot disregard the schools’ custodial and tutelary responsi-
bility for children.”121 
This custodial role includes some caretaking responsibilities, as the 
Court identified in Earls.  There, the Court again noted that the schools have 
this custodial responsibility and, as such, are responsible for maintaining the 
“discipline, health, and safety” of students.122  Indeed, these caretaking roles 
are so significant that they serve as the basis for limiting students’ privacy 
interests in school.123 
C.  The Same or Similar Roles, but Different Constitutional 
Significance 
All of the roles identified for families and schools, then, involve a sig-
nificant amount of overlap.  In addition, the core function of those overlap-
ping roles is caretaking of children.124  It is caretaking work because it in-
volves meeting the needs of children that they cannot meet themselves.125  
Children cannot independently educate themselves for citizenship, teach 
themselves morals and values, discipline themselves, or maintain their health 
and safety.  They need others to do that for them.  In identifying these roles 
for both families and the public schools, Supreme Court doctrine reflects that 
the Court sees both families and schools as being involved in these caretaking 
roles. 
At the same time, as much as these roles are similar or, at least on a 
practical level, the same, the Court treats them very differently in terms of 
their constitutional significance.  Families’ roles with respect to their children 
represent the embodiment of Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests.  They 
                                                          
 120.  Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995). 
 121.  Id. at 656.  That said, the Court in Acton also noted in dicta that as much as schools have 
this custodial role, it does not result in schools also having “such a degree of control over children 
as to give rise to a constitutional ‘duty to protect.’”  Id. at 655 (quoting Deshaney v. Winnebago 
Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989)). 
 122.  Earls, 536 U.S. at 830.  The Court quoted Acton when it stated, “Central . . . is the fact that 
the subjects of the Policy are (1) children, who (2) have been committed to the temporary custody 
of the State as schoolmaster.”  Id. at 830 (quoting Acton, 515 U.S. at 654). 
 123.  Id. at 830–31. 
 124.  See supra notes 37, 41 and accompanying text. 
 125.  Id.  
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also implicate, among other things, First Amendment free exercise interests.  
In Meyer, the Court said, “[w]ithout doubt, [the liberty guaranteed under the 
Fourteenth Amendment denotes] . . . the right [to] . . . bring up children.”126  
Similarly, in Pierce, the Court said the education statute in question was un-
constitutional because it “unreasonably interfere[d] with the liberty of parents 
and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their 
control.”127  In Yoder, the Court identified as among the “fundamental rights 
and interests . . . the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious 
upbringing of their children.”128  With respect to the public schools, however, 
the Court has pointedly concluded that their roles are not infused with the 
same constitutional significance.  In New Jersey v. T.L.O.,129 the Court dis-
pensed with the notion that the public schools’ authority is in loco parentis 
and therefore imbued with the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment or 
free from the strictures of the First or the Fourth.130  It said that idea “is in 
tension with contemporary reality and the teachings of this Court.”131  The 
roles of families and schools, then, are similar or the same, but also not. 
II.  THE FAMILIES’ AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS’ DISSIMILAR DEGREES OF 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR HARMS TO CHILDREN 
The constitutional significance of the families’ roles might suggest that 
families enjoy greater protection from interference in carrying out their care-
taking responsibilities than schools.132  The opposite, however, is true.  When 
children are harmed in the care of their families, families can and readily do 
face significant responsibility on an institutional level.  That is, consequences 
inure not just to the individual who caused the harm but also to the family as 
a whole.  This institutional responsibility includes that the family structure 
can be altered.  In cases of child abuse and neglect, this structural alteration 
occurs when a child is removed from the family.133  This family responsibility 
is relatively easy to impose.  The legal threshold for investigation of abuse 
and neglect in the majority of states is very low, sometimes requiring nothing 
more than a mere suspicion of some harm to or neglect of the child; in appli-
cation, the factual allegations required to support the imposition of liability 
can also be relatively insignificant.134  By contrast, imposing liability for 
                                                          
 126.  262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).  
 127.  268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925). 
 128.  406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972). 
 129.  469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
 130.  Id. at 336. 
 131.  Id.  
 132.  See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 133.  See infra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 134.  See infra notes 145–146 and accompanying text. 
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harm to children on the public schools as institutions—that is, holding the 
public schools and not just individual staff liable—requires overcoming sub-
stantial obstacles.  Schools’ liability could be imposed by the assertion of a 
number of different claims.  For all such claims, though, the threshold legal 
standards are high, and the facts that have to be alleged to support them are 
extreme. 
A.  The Ease of Imposing Responsibility on the Family for Harms to 
Children 
All states have a system for imposing responsibility on families when 
children are harmed in their care.  These systems, embodied in child abuse 
and neglect laws, all provide mechanisms for reporting, investigating, and 
adjudicating allegations of abuse or neglect of children.135  Although many 
child welfare laws allow for the investigation of abuse and neglect perpetu-
ated by non-family members, the thrust of the laws and the child welfare sys-
tems they establish is to protect children from harms resulting from abuse or 
neglect by family members.136 
1.  A Broad, Low Threshold for Family Responsibility 
As Doriane Lambelet Coleman has pointed out, child welfare laws have 
intentionally broad, low legal standards for what constitutes abuse and ne-
glect because the goal of the laws is to cast a wide net to root out any possible 
abuse or neglect.137  For example, the definition of “abuse” can simply mean 
                                                          
 135.  CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 
2014, at viii (2014), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/cm2014.pdf#page=10 [hereinaf-
ter CHILD MALTREATMENT]. 
 136.  This focus on families is reflected in the statistics on the relationship between maltreated 
children and the perpetrators of that maltreatment.  In federal fiscal year (“FFY”) 2014, 91.6% of 
children who were victims of abuse were maltreated by parents.  Id. at 26.  Of course, this need for 
protection from harms to children by family members exists.  In FFY 2014, the United States De-
partment of Health and Human Services Children’s Bureau estimated that 1580 children nationally 
died of abuse or neglect.  Id. at 51.  It is also worth noting, though, that as much as this need for 
protection exists, so too does bias exist in the system, as even the federal government has acknowl-
edged.  CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., RACIAL 
DISPROPORTIONALITY AND DISPARITY IN CHILD WELFARE 1 (Nov. 2016), 
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/racial_disproportionality.pdf#page=1&view=Introduction 
[hereinafter RACIAL DISPROPORTIONALITY] (acknowledging the racial bias and class bias in the 
child welfare system).  Scholars have also pointed out this bias.  E.g., Coleman, supra note 9, at 417 
(arguing that the child welfare system does more harm than good in its attempts to help children); 
Matthew I. Fraidin, Decision-Making in Dependency Court: Heuristics, Cognitive Biases, and Ac-
countability, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 913, 940 (2013) (arguing that race, among other things, serves 
as a heuristic in child welfare cases). 
 137.  Coleman, supra note 9, at 428 (“The first feature of the prevailing strategy involves, at 
least in principle, taking no chances and casting the widest net possible in identifying the cases that 
will be investigated.  This objective is accomplished through broad legal definitions of abuse and 
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“the infliction or allowing of physical injury”138 or “any willful act . . . that 
results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury or harm.”139  Indeed, in all 
but twelve states, the abuse—or neglect—need not be of any particular de-
gree.140  Because these definitions do not require any degree of harm, any 
amount of physical injury or neglect can suffice to meet this definition and 
lead to families’ involvement in the child welfare system. 
The system for discovering child abuse and neglect is multi-step; the 
first step is reporting mere suspicions of abuse and neglect.141  While contin-
ued involvement in the child welfare system after an initial report requires 
that the state meet a higher burden of proof, the substantive definition of 
abuse and neglect remains the same at each step.142  So, while the state may 
need to marshal more evidence of abuse or neglect later in the child welfare 
                                                          
neglect, and screening criteria that are nearly as broad.  It also involves statutory or regulatory pro-
visions that mandate the investigation of all screened-in reports, and related provisions that allow 
state officials to go to court to compel compliance with the investigations.”). 
 138.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-201(2) (2014). 
 139.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01(2) (West 2010). 
 140.  Those twelve states are Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Ne-
braska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, and Texas. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-
1602 (2009); 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3 (West 2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-34-1-1 (Lex-
isNexis 2013); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 600.020 (West 2016); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 603(2) 
(2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51A (West 2008); NEB. REV. STAT.  § 28-710 (2008); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6–8.9 (West 2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-2 (LexisNexis 2009); N.Y. 
FAM. CT. ACT § 1012 (McKinney 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-101 (West 2015); TEX. FAM. 
CODE ANN. § 261.001 (West 2014).  North Carolina, though, only imposes a particularized degree 
of harm for abuse, but it does not impose one for neglect.  N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-101 (West 
2015).  Doriane Lambelet Coleman notes that these definitions are “typically vague and overbroad, 
often purposefully so.”  See Coleman, supra note 9, at 428. 
 141.  CHILD MALTREATMENT, supra note 135, at 7–8 (“For FFY 2014, a nationally estimated 
2.2 million reports (screened-in referrals) received dispositions.  This is an 8.3 percent increase from 
the 2010 national estimate of 2.0 million reports that received dispositions.”).  Even in early stages 
of investigations, families face the risk of structural alteration and institutional-level responsibility.  
Consider, for instance, New York, where a child can be removed from their parent without consent 
or court process upon reasonable cause to believe the child is in imminent danger.  N.Y. SOC. SERV. 
LAW § 417(1)(a) (McKinney 2010).  However, if the cause is not reasonable, the child is still re-
moved from the parent’s care, thus altering the structure of the family at least temporarily.  As at 
least one scholar has pointed out that even the risk of such removals, let alone the actual removals, 
however temporary, causes harm to families.  Doriane Lambelet Coleman has described the harms 
that arise to even young children from the intrusiveness of the investigation and the potential for 
removal from the home.  See Coleman, supra note 9, at 511–22.  Matthew Fraidin also cites the 
work of Dr. Joseph Doyle on the outcomes of children in foster care, which include increased inter-
action with the juvenile justice system, teen pregnancy, and difficulty finding employment.  Mat-
thew I. Fraidin, Stories Told and Untold: Confidentiality Laws and the Master Narrative of Child 
Welfare, 63 ME. L. REV. 1, 25–26 (2010). 
 142.  See Coleman supra note 9, at 429 (“In part because the definitions of abuse and neglect are 
so broad, and because anyone is permitted to make a report, including those with no training in 
identifying maltreatment, most states have procedures to ‘screen in’ reports that conform to their 
official interpretations, and correspondingly to ‘screen out’ nonconforming reports.  This process 
serves to ensure, to the extent possible, that the state conducts formal investigations only in circum-
stances where legally relevant conditions exist.”). 
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process to meet the higher standards of proof, in most states, the evidence 
still only needs to prove that some abuse or neglect happened, not that it was 
particularly severe.143  Families face the risk of involvement in the child wel-
fare system, and therefore the risk of institutional responsibility based on al-
legations and proof of some abuse or neglect, potentially no matter the sever-
ity. 
2.  The Low Threshold in Application 
Of course, that families face a large theoretical risk of institutional re-
sponsibility does not mean that risk will be realized through abuse or neglect 
investigation or prosecution.144  The child welfare statistics, however, suggest 
many families do face this consequence.  In Federal Fiscal Year (“FFY”) 
2014, approximately twenty-three percent of children for whom states re-
ceived reports of abuse and neglect were removed from the home and placed 
in foster care.145 
The reasons for this degree of family responsibility are not just that a 
great deal of child maltreatment happens, though of course it does happen.146  
The reasons include that the child welfare system has been willing to find the 
removal of children from families appropriate even when allegations argua-
bly do not justify it.147  Recall, for example, In re L.Z., the case discussed 
briefly in the Introduction.148  In that case, L.Z., a toddler, was removed from 
the family, and his mother’s rights were permanently terminated after Child 
                                                          
 143.  See infra note 163 and accompanying text. 
 144.  However, even the possibility of such structural changes by way of an investigation can 
result in significant stress and other psychological repercussions.  Gupta-Kagan, supra note 9, at 
914 (noting that child welfare “investigations are invasive of the right to family integrity and cause 
significant anxiety and other emotional distress”). 
 145.  CHILD MALTREATMENT, supra note 135, at 78.  And certainly a system that allows for 
more than 1500 deaths per year while also causing harm to the children they do take into custody is 
one fraught with problems.  Id. at 52.  Among these problems is the vast disproportionality of cases 
involving children of color and children who are low-income.  RACIAL DISPROPORTIONALITY, su-
pra note 136; Coleman, supra note 9, at 441 n.67.  The procedural safeguards in place to protect 
against these problems, as Clare Huntington has pointed out, are far from sufficient.  As Huntington 
points out, they are too little too late.  The assistance of counsel, for example, if provided, is not 
provided until after a child has been removed from the home.  Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in 
Child Welfare, 53 UCLA L. REV. 637, 658 (2006). 
 146.  In FFY 2014, approximately one-fifth of the reports of child abuse and neglect were sub-
stantiated.  CHILD MALTREATMENT, supra note 135, at x. 
 147.  Josh Gupta-Kagan cites the statistic that 26.8% of children who are removed from the home 
are returned in six months as persuasive evidence of these unnecessary removals.  See Gupta-Kagan, 
supra note 9, at 916.  He has also pointed out the problems attendant to this over-inclusiveness.  
Among them is that it strains the system to the point of being nearly incapable of protecting children 
who truly do need it.  Id. at 912–13. 
 148.  111 A.3d 1164 (Pa. 2015). 
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Protective Services (CPS) became involved with the family.149  CPS involve-
ment occurred as the result of harms to L.Z. that CPS attributed to his aunt, 
with whom L.Z. and his mother lived.150  L.Z.’s mother left him in his aunt’s 
care for two days, and when she returned to him, he had a cut on his penis as 
well as a bruise on his cheeks, diaper rash, and a yeast infection.151  Although 
CPS attributed these harms to the aunt, his mother nonetheless lost custody 
of him.  In other words, the mother and son experienced a significant change 
to their family structure for injuries that the mother did not inflict.152 
In another case, In Re Adam B.,153 a mother, Alma B., lost custody of  
her three boys for arguably inadequate reasons.154  Alma B. lost custody of 
her oldest child, Joshua, because she could not get him to take his psychiatric 
medications and did not ensure he attended all of his outpatient mental health 
therapy sessions.155  She lost custody of her younger son, Isaiah, because he 
received a burn, possibly from a space heater, and she did not seek medical 
treatment immediately.156  In addition, the lower court made a finding that 
she could not protect Isaiah from Joshua.157 Alma lost custody of her third 
son, Adam, because of “anticipatory neglect,” meaning that the court con-
cluded that there was a probability he would be neglected because his broth-
ers had been neglected.158  Although evidence indicated that Alma B. also 
missed three voluntary parenting classes and seemed agitated and anxious at 
the hospital when doctors, suspecting abuse, questioned her, these and other 
allegations in the case do not unquestionably lead to the conclusion that Alma 
B. should have lost custody of her children.159   
Another reading of her case is that she was struggling with the difficult 
task of parenting—as a single parent—a child with a significant psychiatric 
disorder, which could explain why she could not get him to all of his therapy 
sessions and to take all of his medicine.  That, in turn, could also explain why 
                                                          
 149.  Id. at 1167–69. 
 150.  Id. at 1167–68. 
 151.  Id.  
 152.  Id.  One issue before the court was whether the mother had to be physically present at the 
time the injuries occurred in order to be presumed to have abused her child.  Id. at 1175–76.  The 
court concluded she did not.  It said that even if the parent was not present at the time of the abuse, 
the parent could nonetheless be found to have abused or neglected her child “due to his or her failure 
to provide protection for the child.”  Id. at 1184.  In so holding, the court specifically noted that the 
mother had failed to provide evidence that she had “no reason to fear leaving Child with Aunt.”  Id. 
at 1186.  Thus, its interpretation of the relevant statute allows for parents who do not abuse their 
children to be held responsible if they cannot prove a negative.  
 153.  53 N.E.3d 134 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016). 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Id. at 140–42. 
 156.  Id. at 141–42. 
 157.  Id. at 144. 
 158.  Id. at 145. 
 159.  Id. at 137. 
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Joshua may himself have burned Isaiah.  While Alma missed parenting clas-
ses, she missed them during the time when she was also dealing with Joshua’s 
psychiatric hospitalization.  Further, while Alma seemed agitated when ques-
tioned by doctors about possible abuse, that reaction is hardly irrational when 
a mother is being questioned in such a way.  Reading the facts in this way 
suggests that Alma B. needed support, not that she needed to lose her chil-
dren.  Indeed, the social worker who worked most closely with the family 
testified: 
that she observed Alma B.’s interactions with the children from 
March of 2014 through July of 2014 and that they were appropri-
ate; that during this time, the children never stated that they felt 
unsafe in Alma B.’s care, nor did they show any signs of abuse or 
neglect; that they appeared well nourished, clean and appropriately 
dressed; and that she observed Alma B. redirecting Joshua when 
he would misbehave and she saw Alma B. engage with her chil-
dren.160   
That the child welfare system chose the narrative that left her family struc-
turally altered evidences the readiness with which it will impose institutional 
responsibility on the family for harms to children. 
This readiness to remove children from families is also reflected in cases 
where parents are working with the child welfare system to address causes 
and effects of suspected child abuse and neglect.  In In re Katie S.,161 a case 
involving neglect, a mother lost parental rights even though she was actively 
trying to better her ability to parent.162  She lost custody of her two children, 
Katie S. and David S., who were five and sixteen months, respectively, at the 
time the case was brought.163  To be sure, the allegations support a finding of 
neglect.164  The mother acknowledged that she did not feed her children reg-
ularly and she sometimes left them unsupervised.165  However, a counselor 
who was working with the mother testified that she was dutifully attending 
counseling sessions and sincerely trying to get her children back.166  Yet in-
stead of letting the mother continue to make these efforts to see if she could 
learn to improve herself and her parenting, the West Virginia Supreme Court 
terminated her parental rights.167  It also did so only approximately seven 
months after the case began, giving her less than a full year to try to learn to 
                                                          
 160.  Id. at 138–39.  
 161.  479 S.E.2d 589 (W.Va. 1996). 
 162.  Id. at 594–95.  
 163.  Id. at 593. 
 164.  Id. at 594.  
 165.  Id.  
 166.  Id. at 599. 
 167.  Id. at 601. 
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be a better parent.168  The court removed the mother’s children and under-
mined her efforts, demonstrating the legal system’s willingness to hold fam-
ilies responsible for harms to children. 
Greene v. Camreta169 is a similar case involving a mother who lost cus-
tody of her children despite evidence that she was working cooperatively 
with the child welfare system.170  The difference in Greene was that she was 
not accused of any abuse or neglect.171  In Greene, Sarah Greene temporarily 
lost custody of her two daughters, S.G. and K.G., because of allegations that 
Sarah’s husband and the girls’ father, Nimrod Greene, had sexually abused 
an unrelated boy and S.G.172  Although she successfully raised constitutional 
challenges to the temporary loss of custody, her case shows again how easy 
it is to hold families responsible for harms to children despite evidence that 
one parent has caused no harm or has worked to ameliorate the harm.173 
Cases of domestic violence also serve as examples of this readiness to 
impose family responsibility.  In these cases, the family is sometimes held 
responsible not only for harms parents did not impose but from which they 
also suffered.174  For example, in In re N.P.,175 B.P., a mother and survivor of 
domestic violence, lost custody of her two daughters, N.P. and I.P.176  B.P. 
was abused by her husband, M.P.177  Related to that, the family underwent 
several household moves, and B.P. consequently suffered “battered women’s 
syndrome.”178  Both N.P. and I.P. witnessed that abuse, and they therefore 
suffered depressive disorder and posttraumatic stress disorder.179  As a result, 
                                                          
 168.  Id. at 598. 
 169.  588 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 170.  Id. 
 171.  Id. at 1019–20.  The mother, Sarah Greene, submitted an affidavit in which she stated that 
she had told the case worker investigating suspected abuse that she would comply with a Depart-
ment of Human Services safety plan.  That plan called for ensuring that Sarah’s husband would not 
have contact with her daughters and for the girls to be evaluated for sexual abuse.  Id. at 1018, 1035.   
 172.  Id. at 1016, 1020. 
 173.  Id. at 1035–36. 
 174.  A number of scholars have written about the problems of removing children from the cus-
tody of their mothers because they have witnessed their mothers’ abuse.  E.g., Leigh Goodmark, 
Achieving Batterer Accountability in the Child Protection System, 93 KY. L.J. 613, 655 (2004–
2005) (arguing that the legal system needs to better tailor its responses to child witnesses of domestic 
violence to better address the problem and protect children); Thomas L. Hafemeister, If All You 
Have Is a Hammer: Society’s Ineffective Response to Intimate Partner Violence, 60 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 919, 925 (2011) (calling for a more flexible response, including in the child welfare system, 
to intimate partner violence). 
 175.  882 A.2d 241 (D.C. 2005). 
 176.  Id. at 243–44.  
 177.  Id. at 244.  
 178.  Id. at 245–46. 
 179.  Id. at 245. 
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B.P. lost custody of her children because of the harms imposed by her hus-
band.180 
While these cases discuss the imposition of family responsibility by way 
of removing a child from the family and thus altering the family structure as 
a whole, that is not the only way to impose responsibility on the family as an 
institution in cases of child abuse or neglect.  Such responsibility can also be 
imposed when the adjudicatory process requires a parent to be placed on a 
central child abuse and neglect registry.181  Inclusion on these registries can 
affect job prospects and thus the economic stability of the whole family.182  
Further, when the parent must comply with a safety plan, the plan’s strictures 
can affect the whole family.183  Removal of the child from the home, then, is 
simply the most obvious way of imposing responsibility on the family as a 
whole for harms to children. 
The intent of the foregoing discussion is neither to say that children 
should never be removed from the home nor that any child should have to 
suffer any harm, whether or not severe.  It is to say, though, that these legal 
standards, cases, and statistics reflect the relative ease with which the family 
can be held responsible as an institution for harms to children even when the 
parents have not themselves imposed the harm, are working to improve their 
parenting, or themselves suffer from the harm that results in family liability. 
B.  The Relative Difficulty of Imposing Responsibility on Schools for 
Harms to Children 
By contrast, when children are harmed in school because of the actions 
of school officials or others, imposing responsibility on the public schools is 
an altogether different matter.  A number of claims could potentially be made 
against the school to hold it as an entity, as opposed to any individual actor, 
responsible for such harms.  None, however, are easy to make.  The threshold 
legal standards are high, and, in application, the facts that have to be alleged 
to satisfy those standards are extreme.184  That is not to say that students have 
                                                          
 180.  Id. at 251.  While B.P. surely needed assistance to help extricate herself from her marriage 
and take care of her children, the state effectively revictimized her by permanently altering her 
whole family structure.  G. Kristian Miccio, for example, critiqued a child welfare system that al-
lows for this treatment of women experiencing domestic violence and their children in this way as 
penalizing the women while simultaneously failing to help the children.  G. Kristian Miccio, A 
Reasonable Battered Mother? Redefining, Reconstructing, and Recreating the Battered Mother in 
Child Protective Proceedings, 22 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 89, 91 (1999). 
 181.  Josh Gupta-Kagan offers a thoughtful discussion on the problems associated with these 
central registries and safety plans.  See Gupta-Kagan, supra note 9, at 900–05. 
 182.  Id. at 900.  
 183.  Id. 
 184.  That is not to say that an individual who actually caused the harm cannot be held respon-
sible for something when they harm children.  Indeed, they can.  For example, Kathleen Garrett, the 
teacher discussed infra, was found guilty of child maltreatment in a related criminal matter.  T.W. 
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no hope of succeeding against schools; they do.185  It is to say, though, that 
claims against schools are hard to make, especially as compared to the rela-
tive ease with which families as a whole face repercussions for harms to chil-
dren.  The cases below demonstrate that even when children suffer significant 
harms in school, attempts to hold the schools responsible are fraught with 
challenges.  Children who are harmed in school have to fashion a claim out 
of law that has, quite simply, developed in such a way that schools as insti-
tutions are protected from being held responsible for it.186 
1.  Substantive Due Process Claims for Physical and Emotional 
Harm in School 
When a child is injured in school as the result of harms perpetrated by 
school staff, a child can try to hold the school responsible by alleging a vio-
lation of their Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests in “personal privacy 
and bodily security.”187  The standard for establishing this violation is high.  
The test has three or four parts, depending on the federal circuit in which the 
case is brought.  All courts will balance three factors: 1) the need for force; 
2) the relationship between the need and the amount of force used; and 3) the 
severity of the injury.188  The requirement of a severe injury alone makes the 
                                                          
ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole Cty., 610 F.3d 588, 599 (11th Cir. 2010); infra notes 191–
204.  However, holding schools responsible is difficult.  When schools have a lesser degree of re-
sponsibility on an institutional level, it leaves children vulnerable to harm in school.  See infra Part 
III.B.2. 
 185.  For example, in Hill v. Cundiff, a student, Doe, was raped by another student after school 
administrators had her act as bait to catch another student in the act of sexual harassment.  797 F.3d 
948, 955–56 (11th Cir. 2015).  Doe brought Title IX, equal protection, and state tort claims against 
the school board and individual school administrators.  Id. at 966.  The Eleventh Circuit concluded 
the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the Title IX claim and some of the tort 
claims was in error, though it affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the equal protection and 
some other state tort claims.  Id. at 984–86.  Likewise, in Neal ex rel. Neal v. Fulton County Board 
of Education, a high school teacher allegedly hit a student, Durante Neal, with a metal weight lock 
in the eye, and as a result, Neal lost his eye.  229 F.3d 1069, 1071 (11th Cir. 2000).  Neal brought 
substantive due process and tort claims against the school board and individual school staff.  Id.  
The Eleventh Circuit overturned the district court’s dismissal of the substantive due process claims, 
concluding that such actions stated a claim for a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id.  Stu-
dents do have viable claims involving harms suffered in school against the schools as institutions, 
but when they do, the facts involve extreme circumstances such as rape-baiting and the loss of an 
eye. 
 186.  Infra note 188–189 and accompanying text. 
 187.  Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980) (determining a school’s use of corporal 
punishment could violate the Fourteenth Amendment, stating “the substantive due process inquiry 
in school corporal punishment cases must be whether the force applied caused injury so severe, was 
so disproportionate to the need presented, and was so inspired by malice or sadism rather than a 
merely careless or unwise excess of zeal that it amounted to a brutal and inhumane abuse of official 
power literally shocking to the conscience”). 
 188.  T.W., 610 F.3d at 599.  Some courts will also look at the pedagogical reason more deeply 
and inquire as to whether it “was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or 
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standard high and purposefully so.  It explicitly and pointedly serves to pro-
tect public schools from liability except in cases of “only the most egregious 
official conduct [that] can be said to be ‘arbitrary in the constitutional 
sense.’”189 
Even if a child has suffered severe injuries that could support a substan-
tive due process claim, many of these claims still fail in application.  One 
reason they tend to fail in application is because the courts have been willing 
to excuse the acts of many school officials if a pedagogical or disciplinary 
reason—any plausible pedagogical or disciplinary reason—is asserted to sat-
isfy the first prong of the test that inquires into the need for force.190 
T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. School Board of Seminole County191 offers an ex-
ample of how courts will strain to find a pedagogical justification to relieve 
schools of liability.192  T.W. involved a child, T.W., with pervasive develop-
ment delay, depression, and anxiety,193 who suffered because of treatment by 
his teacher, Kathleen Garrett.194  Among other things, Garrett taunted T.W., 
“pick[ing] and nag[ging him] . . . until he would just get to the point where 
he just couldn’t take it anymore” and would act out.195  Then, Garrett would 
physically restrain him, one time in such a way that it could have caused 
asphyxiation.196  In addition, on one occasion she tripped him.197  As a result, 
T.W.’s extant disabilities grew more severe, and he developed a new disabil-
ity, post traumatic stress disorder.198  The school district could have prevented 
this harm because the school district had received reports that Garrett had 
mistreated other students.199  The school district did not remove her from 
                                                          
maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.”  Gottlieb ex rel. Calabria v. 
Laurel Highlands Sch. Dist., 272 F.3d 168, 173 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Metzger ex rel. Metzger v. 
Osbeck, 841 F.2d 518, 520 (3d Cir. 1988)). 
 189.  T.W., 610 F.3d at 598 (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845–46 
(1998)). 
 190.  See infra notes 203, 210 and accompanying text.  In addition, even plaintiffs who can allege 
a very severe injury will have a hard time satisfying a court that their injury is of constitutional 
magnitude if it is emotional or psychological harm.  As courts have noted, “Plaintiffs have not fared 
well where psychological damage forms either the sole basis of or is an element of the plaintiff’s 
substantive due process claim.”  T.W., 610 F.3d at 601 (quoting Dockery v. Barnett, 167 F. Supp. 
2d 597, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)).  For a discussion of how and why emotional harm on its own does 
not support substantive due process claims of students, as well as for examples of other cases in 
which a substantive due process claim alleging severe harm was overcome by a pedagogical reason 
offered by the school for abuse, see Suski, Dark Sarcasm, supra note 38. 
 191.  610 F.3d 588 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 192.  Id. 
 193.  Id. at 593. 
 194.  Id. at 594–96. 
 195.  Id. at 594. 
 196.  Id. at 594–96. 
 197.  Id. at 596. 
 198.  Id. at 596, 601. 
 199.  Id. at 594. 
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working with children, though.200  Instead, it transferred her to the school 
T.W. attended and did not inform the principal of that school of the com-
plaints against her, leaving her free to mistreat children.201 
Even though the school district was therefore complicit in allowing 
T.W.’s harm to happen, T.W.’s substantive due process claim against the 
public schools failed.202  The Eleventh Circuit concluded that “[t]he evidence 
establishes that Garrett’s use of force against T.W. ‘is capable of being con-
strued as an attempt’ to restore order, maintain discipline, or protect T.W. 
from self-injurious behavior.”203  Consequently, it affirmed the lower court’s 
order of summary judgment in favor of the school board.204  That Garrett 
manufactured the disciplinary reason by instigating T.W.’s behavior was 
seemingly of no moment.  That a manufactured disciplinary justification for 
harm suffices to relieve the public schools of responsibility for the harm 
shows the difficulty of imposing responsibility on the public schools. 
Pedagogical as well as disciplinary goals excused the harm to children 
in Domingo v. Kowalski.205  Like T.W., that case involved students with spe-
cial needs who brought a substantive due process claim against their teacher, 
Marsha Kowalski, and the school district because of injuries she caused 
them.206  The allegations of mistreatment included that Kowalski “grabb[ed 
a] . . . student’s face, squeez[ed] his or her cheeks, and point[ed] the student’s 
face toward [her].”207  Kowalski also left a student, who could not inde-
pendently get on and off a toilet, on the toilet for more than a quarter of the 
day.208  She also left another student strapped to a gurney in the hallway out-
side the classroom with a bandana in his mouth.209  Despite this treatment, 
the students did not succeed on their substantive due process claims because 
the district court found Kowalski had a “legitimate educational goal of toilet-
training and legitimate disciplinary goal of maintaining order and focus in 
her classroom” that justified her actions.210  As in T.W., therefore, Domingo 
                                                          
 200.  Id. 
 201.  Id. 
 202.  Id. at 605. 
 203.  Id. at 600 (quoting Gottlieb ex rel. Calabria v. Laurel Highlands Sch. Dist., 272 F.3d 168, 
174 (3d Cir. 2001)). 
 204.  Id. at 605. 
 205.  810 F.3d 403 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 206.  Id. at 406. 
 207.  Id. at 407–08. 
 208.  Id. at 407. 
 209.  Id. 
 210.  Id. at 411.  The Sixth Circuit found this pedagogical justification even after applying the 
fourth factor that considers more deeply whether that justification was a good-faith one.  The court 
stated, 
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shows how even abuse of children in school by teachers will not give rise to 
the public schools’ responsibility if the schools can point to some remotely 
plausible pedagogical reason for the abuse.211  The stated pedagogical or dis-
ciplinary reason justifies the means, seemingly almost no matter how harsh 
the means. 
2.  Claims of Student-on-Student Sexual Harassment in Violation of 
Title IX 
Just as children are sexually abused at home, they are also sexually 
abused at school, both by other students and by teachers.  When they are, 
they can bring claims alleging sexual harassment in violation of Title IX of 
the Civil Rights Act to hold the school responsible for the harassment.  Title 
IX provides: “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be 
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal fi-
nancial assistance . . . .”212  As with substantive due process claims, though, 
the threshold standard for making out claims alleging such discrimination is 
high; in application, the public schools’ actions in failing to address the har-
assment must be egregious in order for a claim to succeed.213 
The Supreme Court both recognized the validity of Title IX claims for 
student-on-student harassment and set the high standard for these claims in 
Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education.214  In Davis, the Court con-
cluded that when one student sexually harasses another student, a school 
could be held responsible if it was “deliberately indifferent to known acts of 
student-on-student sexual harassment” and the harassing student was “under 
the school’s disciplinary authority.”215  However, to satisfy the deliberate in-
difference standard, a school need “merely respond to known peer harass-
ment in a manner that is not clearly unreasonable.”216  To avoid liability, then, 
                                                          
Taking all facts in the light most favorable to Appellants, Kowalski used inappropriate 
instructional and disciplinary methods.  However, as was the conduct of the special-edu-
cation teacher whose inappropriate techniques were examined by the Eleventh Circuit in 
T.W., Kowalski’s educational and disciplinary techniques, though certainly questionable, 
were utilized for a proper educational purpose. 
Id. at 412. 
 211.  Id. The term “abuse” is appropriate here because Kowalski, like Garrett in T.W., faced child 
abuse charges.  Kowalski entered into a consent agreement without admitting guilt.  Id. at 409.   
 212.  20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012). 
 213.  Catharine MacKinnon has critiqued this standard for failing to meet its promise of sex 
equality in education.  Catharine MacKinnon, In Their Hands: Restoring Institutional Liability for 
Sexual Harassment in Education, 125 YALE L.J. 2038 (2016).   
 214.  526 U.S. 629 (1999). 
 215.  Id. at 646–47. 
 216.  Id. at 649. 
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the school has to do something in response.217  The response can be somewhat 
or even largely unreasonable.  As long as the school’s response was not clearly 
unreasonable, though, the school will meet the Davis standard. 
Consequently, in application, that standard has meant that almost any 
action by the schools will suffice to relieve them of responsibility for harm 
to children because of student-on-student sexual harassment.  For example, 
in Doe v. Board of Education of Prince George’s County,218 an elementary-
school-aged boy, J.D., was subjected to repeated instances of sexual harass-
ment by another boy at his school, and the school was aware of the harass-
ment.219  The school was not held responsible for allowing it to continue, 
though, because it responded to the reports of the sexual harassment, however 
ineffectually.220  The harassing behaviors J.D. was subjected to all involved 
another boy, M.O.  M.O., among other things, exposed his genitals to J.D. in 
the classroom library, called J.D. “gay,” and climbed into the bathroom stall 
J.D. was using while M.O. was partially nude with his pants around his an-
kles.221  The harassment began in J.D.’s fourth-grade year and continued into 
his fifth-grade year.222  In response, the school moved J.D. and M.O.’s desks 
apart, gave M.O. an in-school suspension, later warned M.O. that his behav-
ior could lead to a suspension, and gave J.D. a student escort to the bath-
room.223  These interventions not only did not stop the abuse, but the bath-
room escort also exacerbated J.D.’s harm because it resulted in other students 
making “‘horrible jokes’” about J.D.224  Moreover, despite knowing about 
the problems with M.O.’s harassment of J.D. in fourth grade, the school again 
placed them in the same classroom for fifth grade, thus more readily exposing 
J.D. to further abuse by M.O.225  Still, the school’s responses to J.D.’s har-
assment sufficed to defeat his sexual harassment claim against the school.226 
Similarly, in Porto v. Town of Tewksbury,227 the public school was not 
held responsible for the sexual harassment of one student by another student 
because it also did something—again something ineffective, but something 
nonetheless—to address the harassing behavior.228  In Porto, a student, R.C., 
                                                          
 217.  Id.  
 218.  605 F. App’x 159 (4th Cir. 2015 (per curiam)). 
 219.  Id. 
 220.  Id. 
 221.  Id. at 161–63. 
 222.  Id.  
 223.  Id. The school also implemented a sign in/out sheet for the bathroom, but that proved un-
workable and was abandoned in less than a week.  Id. at 163. 
 224.  Id. at 163. 
 225.  Id. at 162.  The action surprised his teacher because she knew of, and knew the school 
administration knew of M.O.’s harassment of J.D. in fourth grade.  Id.  
 226.  Id. at 170. 
 227.  488 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2007). 
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sexually harassed another, S.C., over a period of a year, culminating in a sex-
ual encounter in the school bathroom.229  S.C.’s mother reported a number of 
these incidents to the school.230  The school responded by putting the boys on 
different buses, separating them, having the guidance counselor instruct them 
the behavior was inappropriate, and giving R.C. detention.231  The harassment 
did not stop.  As a result of the harassment, S.C. suffered emotional and psy-
chological harm requiring an inpatient stay at a mental health facility and 
attempted suicide.232  Despite this harm and the school’s ineffectual re-
sponses, S.C.’s Title IX claim against the school failed.233  The claim failed 
because the school did respond to the harassment.234  The court concluded 
that although the school’s response was ineffective in that the harassment 
continued, that did not make it unreasonable.235  Therefore, it met the Davis 
deliberate indifference standard.236 
That said, courts have concluded that schools need not remedy the sex-
ual harassment in responding to it.237  They have good reasons for granting 
this leeway to schools.  An honest effort by a school to truly address the sex-
ual harassment of one student by another could still result in continued sexual 
harassment.  An honest effort to address sexual harassment, though, is quite 
different from a half-hearted attempt to halt harm to students or interventions 
that cause more harm.  Yet, even when schools make half-hearted or coun-
terproductive efforts, the courts do not hold them liable under Title IX. 
3.  Claims of Teacher-on-Student Sexual Harassment in Violation of 
Title IX 
As with sexual harassment claims for student-on-student abuse, the 
standard for holding the school responsible for teacher-on-student sexual har-
assment involves overcoming a high bar.  To make out a claim for teacher-
on-student sexual harassment, a student has to show that a school official 
with the “authority to take corrective action” has actual notice of the sexual 
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harassment and “fails adequately to respond.”238  Failing to adequately re-
spond means “the response must amount to deliberate indifference.”239  So 
the factors are very similar to student-on-student sexual harassment claims, 
and as such, the standard offers a similarly high bar to school responsibil-
ity.240 
The Supreme Court laid out the standard for public school liability in 
cases of teacher-on-student sexual harassment in Gebser v. Lago Vista Inde-
pendent School District.241  There, although the Court found school liability 
possible if the actual notice-deliberate-indifference standard is met, it also 
concluded that the facts of that case did not meet the standard because the 
school did not have actual notice of the sexual harassment.242  In Gebser, a 
student, A. Gebser, was sexually harassed repeatedly over a two-year period 
by a teacher.  More specifically, the teacher engaged in a sexual relationship 
with the student during her freshman and sophomore years in high school.243  
The harassment did not result in school responsibility, however, because 
Gebser failed to explicitly tell any school official with authority that she was 
having a sexual relationship with the teacher.244  The school did know the 
teacher was making inappropriate comments toward students, but because 
Gebser did not explicitly tell the school of the sexual relationship, the court 
concluded that the school lacked actual knowledge of the facts constituting 
sexual harassment.245  Thus, as Justice Stevens noted in his dissent, the 
Gebser standard protects schools from liability for harm to students even 
when the perpetrator of the harm was a school official and “the activity was 
subsidized, in part, with federal moneys.”246  The standard, then, is high in-
deed. 
In applying this standard, subsequent student claims have failed when 
the students cannot show that the school’s notice of the harassment effec-
tively amounted to direct knowledge of it.  For example, in J.F.K. v. Troup 
County School District,247 a forty-five-year-old teacher, Elizabeth Gaddy, en-
gaged in a sexual relationship over approximately a ten-month period with 
O.K.K., a twelve-year-old boy in her homeroom.248  While school officials 
were not directly informed that the sexual relationship itself was occurring, 
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the principal of the school and the superintendent of the school district were 
informed repeatedly of inappropriate behavior directed at O.K.K. by 
Gaddy.249  The principal was informed, among other things, that Gaddy had 
leg-to-leg contact under a blanket on a sofa at her home with O.K.K., that she 
bought O.K.K. and no other students expensive gifts, and that she contacted 
O.K.K. excessively by text.250  Additionally, O.K.K.’s parents, two other par-
ents, and two teachers at the school alerted the principal to the questionable 
behavior.251  In response, the school banned Gaddy from the eighth-grade hall 
at the school.252  Despite this behavior, which six adults, two of whom were 
teachers at the school, found concerning and the school’s near total lack of 
response, the court found the school did not have actual knowledge of the 
sexual relationship and therefore the sexual harassment.253  It found that the 
school lacked actual notice because it lacked direct knowledge of anything 
other than inappropriate behavior.254  As a result, the school faced no respon-
sibility for the harm. 255 
Similarly, in Bostic v. Smyrna School District,256 another school official, 
John Smith, engaged in a sexual relationship with a student, J. Bostic, who 
was a sophomore in the high school where Smith coached.257  The principal 
of the school was informed by two teachers, one of whom was Smith’s wife, 
and Bostic’s father that Smith’s behavior toward Bostic was inappropriate 
and concerning.258  The principal was told that Smith and Bostic were seen 
alone in a parked car together at night.259  The principal was also told that 
Smith and Bostic were seen standing so closely together in the hallway at 
school that the observing teacher thought that they were two students.260  In 
addition, Smith’s wife found them alone together in her classroom.261  When 
the sexual relationship between Smith and Bostic was discovered, Bostic and 
her parents sued Smith and the school under Title IX.262  The case was heard 
by a jury, but because the jury had to find actual knowledge of the sexual 
relationship and not just evidence of a likely one, the school district was not 
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found liable.263  Seemingly nothing short of direct knowledge, therefore, will 
suffice to hold schools responsible for teacher-on-student sexual harassment.  
Ample reason to suspect and investigate teacher-on-student sexual harass-
ment has not been sufficient. 
4.  Bullying 
As has been widely reported, students also are harmed, and sometimes 
die, as the result of bullying in school.264  Students who seek to hold the 
school responsible in some way for the harms resulting from bullying, 
though, have anything but an easy task before them.  Although all fifty states 
have anti-bullying laws in place, none create a right of action if the schools 
fail to follow them or take any steps to address bullying.265  On their own, 
then, the anti-bullying laws provide no way for the schools to be held respon-
sible for harms to children because of bullying in schools.  The threshold for 
making out a bullying case on its own is not just high; it does not exist. 
To make a claim against a school for failing to address bullying, there-
fore, a student who has been harmed by bullying must bring the claim under 
another law.  Primarily, these are claims that the bullying amounts to a vio-
lation of the student’s liberty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment or 
claims that it constitutes unlawful harassment.266  Unsurprisingly, given the 
difficulties previously discussed with bringing these claims against schools, 
the cases alleging bullying violated the Fourteenth Amendment or laws pro-
hibiting harassment also have generally not been successful. 
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For example, in Morrow v. Balaski,267 Emily and Brittany Morrow and 
their parents brought an action against a school for allowing Emily and Brit-
tany to be bullied.268  They alleged the bullying violated their Fourteenth 
Amendment liberty interests because the school failed to protect them from 
it.269  While the Supreme Court in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Depart-
ment of Social Services270 concluded that the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment does not impose any general duty on the state to protect 
individuals,271 it has also recognized limited circumstances in which such a 
duty does exist.272  The Court has found that the state has a duty to protect, 
or care for, prison inmates and persons involuntarily confined to mental 
health facilities because they cannot meet their own needs.273  In application, 
this standard has meant that children arguing that a school had a duty to pro-
tect them must successfully analogize to prisoners or persons committed to 
mental health facilities.274  The Morrows’ claim failed because the Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit found no such fitting analogy.  Relying on Su-
preme Court dicta in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,275 where the 
Court said, “we do not, of course, suggest that public schools as a general 
matter have such a degree of control over children as to give rise to a consti-
tutional ‘duty to protect[,]’” the Morrow court consequently concluded that 
schools have no duty to protect students from private actors.276  As a result, 
the public school was absolved of any responsibility for the harm Emily and 
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Brittany suffered by being “verbally, physically and—no doubt—emotion-
ally tormented by a fellow student[,]” even though all they did to address it 
was “suggest[] that the Morrows consider moving to a different school.”277 
The same kind of challenges plagued the Fourteenth Amendment and 
Title IX sexual harassment claims of another student in Morgan v. Town of 
Lexington.278  There, the bullied student’s claims were based on both the 
Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX.279  The student in Morgan, R.M., suf-
fered repeated physical and verbal bullying in school.280  Among other things, 
students at his school pulled him to the ground and “beat him, repeatedly 
kicking and punching him in the head and stomach.”281  He was called “‘Man-
dex Man,’ ‘thunder thighs,’ and ‘hungry hippo’ . . . [and] was ‘pushed, 
tripped, punched or verbally assaulted while walking in school hallways.’”282  
He “was also ‘table topped,’ in which ‘one person gets down on all fours 
behind the victim to push the victim behind the knees, and then one or two 
other individuals push the victim so that the victim falls backwards.’”283  As 
a result, R.M. experienced anxiety leading him to miss 112 days of school.284  
Although the school knew of all of the bullying, in part because some of it 
had been captured on video, it did little more than promise to investigate in 
response.285  Christine Morgan, R.M.’s mother, argued that the school’s fail-
ure to respond to the bullying created the danger and therefore violated 
R.M.’s Fourteenth Amendment rights.286  The court, however, decided that 
the school’s failure to respond did not create the danger because its inaction 
did not affirmatively cause the harm.287  R.M.’s Fourteenth Amendment 
claim consequently failed.288  R.M.’s Title IX claim met the same fate be-
cause the court concluded that sexual harassment was only one form and not 
the primary form of harassment.289  The court said that R.M. endured “undif-
ferentiated bullying” that was not so rooted in sexual harassment as to give 
rise to a claim of sex discrimination.290  Thus, even when the schools do noth-
ing in the face of known, severe bullying, they lack responsibility for the 
consequent harm to the victims of the bullying. 
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5.  Tort Claims 
Students who have been harmed in school in any of the above discussed 
ways or in others ways can also bring an action in tort against the school itself 
in addition to or in lieu of any action against an individual actor.  As with 
substantive due process, Title IX, and bullying-related claims, though, these 
common law claims are not easy to make.  They do at times succeed, but 
student claimants have to overcome the obstacles of immunity and causation 
in order to do so.291 
When teachers or other school staff members cause harm to students, 
schools as entities can be protected from liability by laws granting them im-
munity.292  Schools enjoy immunity from liability for actions of staff who are 
exercising discretionary functions.293  While what counts as “discretionary” 
varies by jurisdiction, it has shielded schools from liability for harms to chil-
dren caused by other staff, other students, and themselves.294 
Where immunity does not bar children’s claims against the school en-
tity, they can sue the schools in tort under theories of respondeat superior 
and negligent supervision.295  For respondeat superior claims, a child must 
show the staff member’s actions for which the school is allegedly responsible 
were within the scope of employment.296  This requirement poses a not insig-
                                                          
 291.  E.g., Samantha Neiman et al., Bullying: A State of Affairs, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 603, 627 (2012) 
(noting in addressing claims for bullying “[e]ven when conduct by a school official satisfies the 
elements of a common law cause of action, various forms of immunity from tort liability often serve 
as shields to school districts.”); Ari Ezra Waldman, Tormented: Antigay Bullying in Schools, 84 
TEMP. L. REV. 385, 410 (2012) (noting, in discussing potential tort claims, a bullied student could 
make a claim despite causation and immunity hurdles, but stating, “the prognosis is . . . dim” for 
redress); Daniel B. Weddle, Bullying in Schools: The Disconnect Between Empirical Research and 
Constitutional, Statutory, and Tort Duties to Supervise, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 641 (2004) (providing a 
comprehensive analysis of how tort serves as a limited recourse and means of redress for bullying).  
J.W. v. Birmingham Board of Education serves as a recent example of the difficulty of bringing 
such claims against schools and individual school employees.  In that case, students in Birmingham 
City Schools in Alabama brought an action against the School Board and Birmingham Police De-
partment for using a chemical spray against them as a “standard response even for the non-threat-
ening infraction that is universal to all teenagers—i.e., backtalking and challenging authority” in a 
“cavalier” way and causing them “severe pain.”  143 F. Supp. 3d 1118, 1126 (N.D. Ala. 2015).  
While the plaintiffs prevailed on some of their constitutional claims, they lost their tort claims be-
cause of qualified immunity.  Id. at 1158–59.  Reflecting on the case, Jerri Katzerman, class counsel 
for the plaintiffs and former Deputy Legal Director of the Southern Poverty Law Center, called the 
tort claims and the legal battle over qualified immunity “kind of a pain.”  E-mail from Jerri Katzer-
man, Deputy Legal Dir., S. Poverty Law Ctr., to Emily Suski, Assistant Professor of Law, Univ. 
S.C. Sch. of Law (Jan. 12, 2017, 17:02 EST) (on file with author). 
 292.  JAMES A. RAPP, EDUCATION LAW § 12.07(1) (2016). 
 293.  Id. § 12.07(4)(c). 
 294.  Id. § 12.07(3). 
 295.  Id. § 12.14(4)–(5). 
 296.  Id. § 12.14(4)(b). 
 2018] THE PRIVACY OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 463 
 
nificant challenge because a school can argue that intentionally harming stu-
dents by excessive discipline and assault are not within the scope of employ-
ment.297  However, even when the actions of the school staff are outside the 
scope of employment, schools can still be held liable for negligent supervi-
sion.  These negligent supervision claims require “standards of knowledge 
[that] are significant and . . . a foreseeable risk of harm.”298  These require-
ments offer substantial defensive fodder to school districts that can doom 
claims.299 
Similarly, when children are hurt by other children or themselves in 
school, schools can be held responsible for negligent supervision of the stu-
dents.300  However, these claims also are far from sure winners.  While the 
school district does have a duty of reasonable care, it extends only to fore-
seeable risks of harm where increased supervision would have prevented the 
harm.301  These constraints do not serve as a bar to every claim, but they can 
prove a significant hurdle.302 
C.  Comparing the Responsibilities of Families and Schools for Harms 
to Children 
These Fourteenth Amendment, Title IX, bullying, and tort cases on their 
own demonstrate the challenges that lie before children who seek to hold the 
public schools responsible for harms they have suffered.  Comparing the pub-
lic schools’ lack of liability with the relative ease of imposing it on the family 
sets this difficulty in stark relief.  Schools are not held responsible for harms 
to children in school, but families are held responsible for the same or less 
severe harm.  For example, in Domingo v. Kowalski and In re L.Z., both chil-
dren had their cheeks squeezed by an adult.303  In Domingo, though, the 
school faced no responsibility for the very same harm that caused the mother 
to lose custody of her child permanently, even though she did not cause the 
harm.304 
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Similarly, when family members do not impose the harm on children, 
the family can still be held responsible for it, but when schools or school staff 
do cause the harm, the school is not held responsible.  In Greene v. Camreta, 
Sarah Greene, who was not accused of any abuse or neglect, tried to mitigate 
any potential harm to her children by cooperating fully in an investigation 
into whether her husband abused her daughter.305  Yet she temporarily lost 
custody of her daughter.306  By contrast, in T.W., the public school teacher, 
Kathleen Garrett, caused such harm to T.W. that not only did his extant dis-
abilities worsen, but he also developed a new psychological disorder.307  In 
Doe, the way the school responded to the student sexual harassment exacer-
bated the harm to the student.308  In neither case, though, did the school bear 
responsibility for the harm.309 
Additionally, when families make efforts to address harm to children, 
the family is still held responsible when the efforts were not fully effective, 
but when school staff or administrators make half-hearted, ineffective efforts 
to address harm to children, the schools are absolved of responsibility by vir-
tue of those efforts.  In In re Katie S., Katie S.’s sincere efforts to reunite with 
her children were cut off prematurely, and her rights to her children were 
permanently terminated.310  In In re N.P., the mother, M.P., lost custody of 
her children, even though her ability to protect them from any harm resulting 
from her husband’s domestic violence was hampered by that domestic vio-
lence.311  Conversely, in the Title IX cases Porto, J.F.K., and Bostic, the pub-
lic schools either did nothing or nothing effective in the face of reports of 
sexual harassment.312  Yet they faced no responsibility for the harm that re-
sulted to the children in those cases.313 
Finally, when families fail to protect their children from harm by an-
other child in the family, the result can be liability, but schools are not held 
responsible for such failures to protect children for harms by other children.  
For example, in In Re Adam B., Alma B. lost custody of her older son, who 
had a psychiatric disorder, because she could not always get him to take his 
medication, and she lost custody of her younger son because she could not 
protect him from her older son.314  Yet in the above-referenced sexual har-
assment cases, perhaps most egregiously J.F.K., where the school did very 
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little to protect the student from the sexual advances and harassment of a 
teacher, the school is not held responsible.315 
With all that said, it must also be acknowledged that the child welfare 
system, under which families are more easily held responsible for harms to 
children, has a set of policy goals that are very different than those that un-
derlie any individual claims a student might bring against a school for harms 
suffered there.  The child welfare system exists to protect children from fu-
ture harm while claims against schools serve as remedies for past harms.316  
So the imposition of responsibility on families may seem to serve child wel-
fare policy goals in a way that holding schools as institutions responsible for 
harms to children does not serve a remedial policy goal.  That is, removing a 
child from the home arguably is the best means of ensuring a child who has 
been harmed by a family member will not be so harmed again because the 
family member no longer has access to the child.  In contrast, holding public 
schools institutionally responsible for harms to children does not as obviously 
serve as a remedy for past harms.  Because the remedy for past harms is dam-
ages, it arguably does not matter who pays those damages—the school or the 
individual perpetrator of the harm—as long as the damages get paid. 
That argument, however, belies the practical and symbolic significance 
of holding a school district responsible for past harms.  On a practical level, 
a school district simply may have more money than any individual, so recov-
ery for past harms may be more likely if the school itself is responsible.  
While that would without question be a draw on the public fisc, that is true 
of any claim against a school, including claims for race discrimination.  Fur-
ther, the alternative to drawing on the public fisc is potentially denying chil-
dren who have been harmed, abused even, a remedy when the individual de-
fendant cannot pay. 
Second, and perhaps more significantly, holding a school accountable 
for harms suffered there sends a symbolic remedial message of accountability 
on a system-wide level.  It can also do more to remedy the harm than holding 
only the individual who imposed it responsible, because it can force recogni-
tion and remediation of any system-level failures that contributed to the harm.  
Arguably, that could, though, have the perverse effect of schools imposing 
more stringent tactics and harsh discipline to guard against liability instead 
of more meaningfully responding to harms.  While a risk, that is far from the 
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necessary outcome of liability.  As police liability cases, among others, have 
shown, liability can and often does lead to positive reforms.317 
III.  THE PRIVACY OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
That the public schools have notably less responsibility than families for 
harms to children means that the public schools face far less scrutiny than 
families for their decisions affecting whether children are harmed in their 
care.  This relative lack of scrutiny means the public schools not only enjoy 
a measure of privacy but also more privacy than the family does in this re-
spect.  This public school privacy leaves children in school vulnerable to 
harm.  It is also not the only form public school privacy takes.  Public school 
privacy also takes the form of the private, traditionally deemed caretaking 
activities that public schools do.  To explain these privacies and the related 
vulnerability it causes children in school, the concepts of privacy invoked 
here warrant some description. 
A.  Privacy: Its Contours and Myths 
The notion of privacy generally, as feminist scholars who have critiqued 
it note, means a freedom from regulation and intrusion into decision-mak-
ing.318  This freedom from regulation leaves the individual or entities auton-
omous and able to act without another questioning those acts.319  The concept 
of privacy is situated in opposition to that which is public, or regulated by 
outside authorities.320  Because in liberal political theory the concept of pri-
vacy is used to limit the government actions and intrusion on individuals and 
individual decision-making, this notion of freedom from public intervention 
                                                          
 317.  E.g., Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of 
Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845, 861–65 (2001) (pointing out the “fault-fixing” 
effects of police liability). 
 318.  EICHNER, supra note 16, at 34 (“The conceptual demarcation between the public and pri-
vate realms bolsters the idea that the state should not properly concern itself with caretaking and 
human development.”); FINEMAN, supra note 10, at 294 (“I distinguish family or entity privacy 
from constitutional or individual privacy. . . .  Family privacy attaches to the entity of the family, 
not to the individuals who compose it.  Historically, this has meant that, in certain situations, the 
doctrine operates to shield the family unit from state interference, even when the request for inter-
vention comes from one of the family members.”). 
 319.  FINEMAN, supra note 10, at 19–20 (“[O]ur particular constitutional ordering also implies 
that freedom from external rules and regulations generated by government is inherent in individual 
autonomy.  Autonomy is synonymous with a concept of self-governance, and is characterized by 
self-sufficiency and independence, individual qualities that are seen as prerequisites for individual 
freedom of will and action.”). 
 320.  See id. at 150.  Fineman describes the work of Olsen and others to expose the myth of the 
public/private divide and notes that “public” has been thought of as that which is regulated and 
“private” as unregulated.  Id.  Frances Olsen described “public” as potentially unconstitutional, but 
“private” actions as not.  Olsen, supra note 10, at 320–21.  Private actions are shielded from such 
regulation.  Id. 
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inherent in the concept of privacy typically means freedom from state regu-
lation of individuals or entities.321 
Privacy has another dimension as well.  Privacy also means “personal 
and domestic, as opposed to commercial; of the family rather than of the mar-
ketplace; home rather than work.”322  Frances Olsen described privacy in this 
way more than thirty years ago, and the definitions still hold resonance and, 
of course, relate closely to the notion of privacy that involves freedom from 
regulation and intrusion.323 
                                                          
 321.  EICHNER, supra note 16, at 25 (discussing John Rawls’s conceptualization of privacy and 
family, saying “he conceived of families as possessing an internal realm that is and should be left 
immune from the power of the state, and which operates in some natural, pre-political way that 
would be adulterated if the state were to intercede”); FINEMAN, supra note 10, at 296–97 (explaining 
entity privacy as “[w]hat was shielded from state intervention and control was not only specific, 
weighty, intimate decisions, such as the decision to beget or bear a child, but also mundane, day-to-
day family interactions”); Dailey, supra note 10, at 968–69 (“The traditional history of this transi-
tion to the private family is mirrored in the rise of the constitutional doctrine of family privacy.  
Although the family finds no express protection in the Constitution, the Supreme Court has estab-
lished a strong tradition of constitutional protection for ‘the sanctity of the family’ under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Court has interpreted the constitutional guaran-
tee of ‘liberty’ in that clause as recognizing a ‘private realm of family life which the state cannot 
enter.’  This constitutional connection between liberty and privacy derives from one of the central 
tenets in liberal political theory: the distinction between the public and private spheres of human 
life.  Liberal theory conceives of the world as divided between the public sphere of state regulation 
and the private sphere of individual freedom.  Under liberalism, the state’s limited function ‘is to 
guarantee to all individuals an equal opportunity for moral development and self-fulfillment.’  Alt-
hough the state may act to safeguard the principles of individual autonomy and freedom, it must 
nevertheless ‘refrain from intervention in the “private” lives of individuals and from imposing moral 
values that would threaten individual autonomy.’” (footnotes omitted) (first quoting Moore v. City 
of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion); then quoting Prince v. Massachusetts 
321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); then quoting ALLISON M. JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN 
NATURE 35 (1988); and then quoting id.)); Olsen, supra note 10, at 320 (“‘[P]rivacy’ may be in-
voked as a right which itself provides a substantive limit on state action permitted by the constitu-
tion.”). 
 322.  Olsen, supra note 10, at 322.  Exploring the definition of privacy to also discuss its cri-
tiques, Olsen writes, “The so-called first wave of American feminism in the nineteenth century 
focused much attention upon women’s exclusion from public life, challenging the particular divide 
between public and private life. . . .  The so-called second wave of feminism is sometimes said to 
have focused primary attention upon the public/private distinction.”  Id. at 322 (footnote omitted).  
 323.  Indeed, as recently as 2015, in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court relied on these 
notions of domestic, family, and personal privacy to support the notion that the right to marry in-
cludes the right of same-sex couples to marry.  135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015).  The Court explained, 
Like choices concerning contraception, family relationships, procreation, and childrear-
ing, all of which are protected by the Constitution, decisions concerning marriage are 
among the most intimate that an individual can make.  Indeed, the Court has noted it 
would be contradictory “to recognize a right of privacy with respect to other matters of 
family life and not with respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the foun-
dation of the family in our society.”   
Id. (quoting Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978)). 
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1.  Entity and Individual Privacy 
Entities and individuals both enjoy privacy.324  Entity privacy is the no-
tion that the guarantees of freedom from governmental intrusion inure not 
just to individuals but also to certain spheres or zones.325  These zones in-
clude, for example, the home, where the state cannot search without certain 
justification or a warrant.326  The family, significantly for the purposes here, 
comprises another such sphere.327  In cases like Griswold v. Connecticut,328 
the Supreme Court has been unequivocal about the existence of family entity 
privacy.329  In Griswold, where the Court concluded married couples have a 
right to contraceptives, it said that there exists a “private realm of family life 
which the state cannot enter.”330  In Prince v. Massachusetts, the Court indi-
cated that the privacy of families includes the privacy surrounding decisions 
regarding the caretaking of children.331  There the Court said that the “cus-
tody, care and nurture” of children reside first in the parents and also that “in 
recognition of this, . . . [the Court’s previous decisions, including Meyer v. 
Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters] have respected the private realm 
of family life which the state cannot enter.”332 
The notion of individual privacy is embedded in doctrine, including the 
Bill of Rights, though none of the privacy rights are explicitly identified 
                                                          
 324.  E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–85 (1965) (recognizing zones of privacy 
afforded entities, such as homes and the marital relationship).  The Court explained: 
Various guarantees create zones of privacy.  The right of association contained in the 
penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen.  The Third Amendment in its 
prohibition against the quartering of soldiers ‘in any house’ in time of peace without the 
consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. . . .  The present case, then, concerns 
a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitu-
tional guarantees. 
Id. (quoting U.S. Const. amend. III). 
 325.  Id.; see also FINEMAN, supra note 10, at 294 (“Family privacy is a common-law concept 
that is not individualized, but founded on the nature of the protected relationship.”); Dailey, supra 
note 10, at 972 (“With the recognition of parental rights in Meyer and Pierce, the Court brought the 
domestic sphere within the protective scope of the Constitution, thereby establishing limits to the 
power of the state to regulate within this sphere.  The domestic sphere, like the economic market-
place, was ‘privatized’ in the sense that it, too, became a realm of negative liberty whose members 
had a claim to freedom from state intervention.”). 
 326.  Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. 
 327.  FINEMAN, supra note 10, at 59.  Fineman notes that the family has been perceived as oc-
cupying a private sphere and embodying values and norms different than those entities in the public 
sphere.  This leads to legal doctrine that leaves families as entities shielded from scrutiny.  Id. 
 328.  381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 329.  Id. at 484 (“The Fourth and Fifth Amendments were described in Boyd v. United States as 
protection against all governmental invasions ‘of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of 
life.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886))). 
 330.  Id. at 495 (Goldberg, J. concurring) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 
(1944)). 
 331.  321 U.S. at 158. 
 332.  Id. at 166. 
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there.333  Instead, the Supreme Court has found that the constitutional rights 
of privacy derive from “penumbras, formed by emanations from those [ex-
plicit] guarantees” in the Bill of Rights.334  Consequently, in cases like Eisen-
stadt v. Baird,335 the Supreme Court has found that the penumbral rights of 
privacy guarantee specific individual freedoms such as, in that case, the indi-
vidual right to access contraceptives.336  In Eisenstadt, the Court said, “[if] 
the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married 
or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so 
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a 
child.”337  This individual right of privacy has also been extended to include, 
for example, the right to abortion.338  In Roe v. Wade,339 the Supreme Court 
concluded that this individual right to privacy is “broad enough to encompass 
a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”340  The Su-
preme Court has also identified caretaking roles as private.  In Roe, the Court 
identifies child-rearing activities and the education of children, all of which 
involve caretaking, as private.341 
                                                          
 333.  FINEMAN, supra note 10, at 18–19 (“The specific provisions of the Bill of Rights restrain 
the government in regard to the individual, whose liberty and equality are thereby guaranteed.”); 
see also Dailey, supra note 10, at 958 (“Constitutional protection for the family need not derive 
solely, or even primarily, from a principle of negative liberty.  Rather, constitutional protection of 
the family ought to reflect an understanding of the family’s distinct role as a vital intermediate 
institution serving the communal ends of political life.  The family is deserving of constitutional 
protection because of its essential role in creating and maintaining our broader political order.  In 
doctrinal terms, the Constitution should be read to prohibit state action that threatens to undermine 
the family’s place in the political structure otherwise established by that document.” (footnote omit-
ted)); Vivian Hamilton, Principles of U.S. Family Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 31, 57–58 (2006) 
(“The liberal theories articulated by John Locke significantly influenced American statesmen of the 
late-eighteenth century, and his ideas have been considered ‘the touchstone of all subsequent liberal 
thought.’  Locke’s theory of liberal democracy espouses radical individualism and a concomitant 
theory of the negative, limited state.  These ideals together justify a state neutral about all but the 
thinnest conceptions of the human good.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting BRIAN R. NELSON, 
WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT: FROM SOCRATES TO THE AGE OF IDEOLOGY 208 (2d ed. 1996))). 
 334.  Griswold,  381 U.S. at 484 (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 516–22 (1961) (Douglas, 
J., dissenting)). 
 335.  405 U.S. 438 (1972).   
 336.  Id.  
 337.  Id. at 453. 
 338.  Questions exist about whether the right should be rooted in the right of privacy or the Equal 
Protection Clause.  FINEMAN, supra note 10, at 295. 
 339.  410 U.S. 113 (1973).  
 340.  Id. at 153. 
 341.  Id. at 152–53. 
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While the notions of family entity privacy and individual privacy are 
related, Martha Fineman has pointed out that family entity privacy is concep-
tually and analytically distinct from the notions of individual privacy.342  In-
deed, as Fineman notes, in Griswold the Court explains that family entity 
privacy is “older than the Bill of Rights—older than our political parties, 
older than our school system.”343  Recognizing the distinction between indi-
vidual and entity privacy has significance, in part, because the privacy rights 
of individuals can collide with those of the entities in which they function.344 
2.  Dismantling the Public/Private Divide and Piercing Family Entity 
Privacy 
As strong as these notions of privacy are in doctrine and history, femi-
nist scholars have shown them to be constructs.345  In so identifying them, 
                                                          
 342.  FINEMAN, supra note 10, at 295–96 (“The notion of the private family predates, and is 
analytically separate from, the constitutional idea of individual privacy, although this new arena of 
privacy seems rooted in older notions about family relations.”). 
 343.  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).  
 344.  See FINEMAN, supra note 10, at 21 (“There is . . . [an] autonomy of individuals within the 
family, for which feminists have fought by exposing domestic violence and child abuse.  This way 
of thinking about autonomy separates out individuals from the family unit and asks that their inter-
ests be considered separately and protected even against other members of that family unit.”); infra 
Part IV.A.2. 
 345.  EICHNER, supra note 16, at 5; FINEMAN, supra note 10, at 151–52.  The myth that a stark 
dichotomy exists between the public and the private finds a home in, among other places, contem-
porary political theory, and it has been adhered to by courts.  EICHNER, supra note 16, at 17.  As 
Maxine Eichner notes in describing the ideas of political theorist John Rawls, “Some of the features 
of Rawls’s theory . . . have set the agenda for contemporary liberal democratic theory—its focus on 
justice defined in terms of liberty and equality, to the exclusion of other goods such as caretaking 
and human development.”  Id. at 17–18.  As such, Eichner explains, “Rawls conceptualized a world 
with a firm demarcation between the public and private realms,” with the family existing in the 
wholly private realm and the state in the wholly public realm.  Id. at 25.  The family, in this view, 
then assumes the caretaking role of children.  Quoting Rawls, Eichner makes the point that under 
this conception, “a central role of the family is to arrange in a reasonable and effective way the 
raising of and caring for children, ensuring their moral development and education into the wider 
culture.”  Id. at 23 (quoting John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 
765, 788 (1997)).  Eichner points out that these theories and this sharp demarcation between family 
and state are evidenced in, for example, Title VII workplace sex discrimination and Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act cases.  Id. at 30.  Those cases, Eichner persuasively argues, mime the notion of a 
public/private divide because the decision to have children is squarely a private, individual decision, 
and the state has no obligation to support this decision by way of resources.  Id. at 33.  To underscore 
this point, Eichner quotes from one such Supreme Court case, UAW. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 
where it states, “[d]ecisions about the welfare of future children must be left to the parents who 
conceive, bear, support and raise them.”  Id. at 33–34 (quoting UAW. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 
U.S. 187, 206 (1990)).  Significantly, this view is espoused in a case that found a violation of Title 
VII by the defendant company employer, Johnson Controls, for a policy that prohibited women 
from working in certain jobs unless they had documented their infertility.  Johnson Controls, Inc., 
499 U.S. at 191–92.  Eichner does not argue the case should have come out differently, but she does 
argue that Title VII forces a limited inquiry with its focus on justice and not also on caretaking 
interests. 
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feminists have exploded the myth that the divide between the private and the 
public exists, particularly with respect to the family.346  If a line between the 
public and private truly existed, then the family would not be regulated.  Yet 
the family is very much regulated.347  As Maxine Eichner has noted, govern-
ment policies regulate how much control parents have over their children.348  
For example, compulsory school attendance laws require parents to send their 
children to school, with limited exceptions, regardless of whether parents 
want to send their children to school.349  Family leave policies and child sup-
port laws affect how and the degree to which parents can care for their chil-
dren physically and financially.350  And, as Anne Dailey has pointed out, laws 
setting minimum ages to marry, regulating adoption, and establishing child 
custody all serve to reinforce particular government policies regarding fami-
lies and children, and they limit family autonomy and privacy.351  Child wel-
fare laws too, of course, regulate the family.352  The family entity, then, is far 
from private and autonomous.353 
                                                          
 346.  EICHNER, supra note 16, at 25 (“In today’s complex society, there is no way to separate 
out any ‘natural’ function of the family that somehow stands apart from state action.  Instead, how 
families function is inextricably intertwined with both law and social policy.” (footnote omitted) 
(first quoting Martha Minow, All in the Family and in All Families: Membership, Loving, and Ow-
ing, in SEX, PREFERENCE, AND FAMILY 249 (David M. Estlund & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 1997); 
then citing Olsen, supra note 11, at 836)); FINEMAN, supra note 10, at 151 (“Feminists have suc-
cessfully deconstructed the public/private dichotomy in the context of the family.”). 
 347.  EICHNER, supra note 16, at 55 (“The state is not only involved in determining what con-
stitutes a family and when family relationships are dissolved, it is also involved directly and indi-
rectly in a multitude of other ways.”); FINEMAN, supra note 10, at 151 (noting that the family is 
“highly regulated and controlled by the state”). 
 348.  EICHNER, supra note 16, at 55 (“And there are many other ways that state regulation and 
public policy affect family life.”).   
 349.  Table 5.1, supra note 39.  As Eichner notes, the law also regulates families by, 
reinforce[ing] parents’ authority over children by subjecting the children to court super-
vision should they disobey their parents; by preventing other adults from caring for them; 
by allowing parents to have considerable power over whether children are institutional-
ized for mental-health reasons; and by child-labor laws that limit children’s ability to live 
independently. 
EICHNER, supra note 16, at 55. 
 350.  EICHNER, supra note 16, at 56 (“The scope of family-leave laws affects parents’ opportu-
nities to stay home with their children.”). 
 351.  Dailey, supra note 10, at 998–99. 
 352.  See supra Part III.A. 
 353.  Dailey, supra note 10, at 997–98 (“Social and legal historians . . . assert that beneath the 
ideology of family privacy lies a social and legal reality of family regulation.  These theorists ask 
why it is that, despite a rhetoric of family privacy, ‘public involvement in the family seems to have 
grown substantially during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.’  Their inquiry, although tentative 
and incomplete, is nevertheless rigorous enough to challenge two primary assumptions of the con-
ventional theory: first, that the state is prohibited from interfering in family life; and second, that 
the private sphere is confined to domestic affairs of no political or civil significance.”) (footnote 
omitted) (quoting Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1135, 
1137).  Feminists have exposed the myth of the public/private divide in other contexts too.  They 
have noted that “everything is public.”  FINEMAN, supra note 10, at 150. 
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Feminist scholars have not just dismantled the myth of a public/private 
binary, but they have also pointed out the problems associated with this 
myth.354  Among other things, it serves to perpetuate the exploitation of and 
harm to women and children in the family.355  This myth does so by masking 
and subordinating individual privacy rights of women and children to those 
of the family entity.356  Regarding family privacy, Catharine MacKinnon has 
stated, “[T]he measure of the intimacy has been the measure of the oppres-
sion.”357  MacKinnon has argued that family entity privacy allows for male 
aggression and violence to be hidden.358  MacKinnon has been especially 
concerned with the way family privacy has trampled women’s rights and 
served to subordinate women.359  Family privacy, though, has also served to 
support harm to children.360  To the extent the family is private and cannot be 
intruded upon, then child abuse can happen.361  Exploding the myth of family 
                                                          
354. That said, all feminist scholars have not by any means denied the value of privacy.  To the 
contrary, even those who have critiqued notions of privacy, from Elizabeth Schneider to Martha 
Fineman to Maxine Eichner, also have acknowledged its value.  Elizabeth Schneider has called for 
a more nuanced, affirmative embrace of notions of privacy that do not contribute to women’s sub-
jugation.  Schneider, supra note 11, at 974, 984–86.  Martha Fineman has proposed rethinking 
“privacy in such a way as to confer autonomy on caretaking or dependency units.  The beneficiary 
of this privacy is the unit, defined through its functioning, not its form.”  Martha Albertson Fine-
man, What Place for Family Privacy?, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1207, 1221 (1999).  Maxine Eich-
ner is explicit in stating that privacy deserves respect and sees the positive aspects of privacy for 
families regarding, for example, health care decisions.  EICHNER, supra note 16, at 63–65.  Eich-
ner also, though, calls for recognition of the role the state should play in supporting the family as 
it cares for the dependency needs of others.  Id.  Michele Gilman has explained that feminists have 
explored the need to “coerce privacy to retain liberal values” for women at the same time as they 
need to recognize that privacy for some women, notably low-income women and women of color, 
has been “stolen.”  Michele Estrin Gilman, Welfare, Privacy, and Feminism, 39 U. BALT. L. F. 1, 
23 (2008). 
 355.  EICHNER, supra note 16, at 34 (“[D]ependency . . . [has been seen as] properly confined 
within families. . . .  In this framework, we have far less difficulty conceiving of children as falling 
within a parent’s personal sphere of autonomy—and thus allowing parents the right to be free of 
interference in order to raise children as they see fit . . . .”); FINEMAN, supra note 10, at 152 (“[T]he 
private sphere is the location of [women’s] domination and subordination.”). 
 356.  FINEMAN, supra note 10, at 299 (“[T]he idea of family privacy has been severely criticized 
by feminists: children’s rights proponents; and others concerned with the potential for physical, 
emotional, or psychological abuse of some family members by others.  Family privacy has been 
charged with obscuring and fostering inequality and exploitation.”). 
 357.  MACKINNON, supra note 10, at 191. 
 358.  Id. at 190 (“The liberal ideal of the private holds that, so long as the public does not inter-
fere, autonomous individuals interact freely and equally. . . .  Injuries arise through violation of the 
private sphere, not within and by and because of it.”). 
 359.  Id. at 190–91. 
 360.  Fineman, supra note 354, at 1219 (“An additional source of criticism of traditional family 
privacy are those who focus on the rights of children.  The tradition, in this regard, protects parental 
authority”).  Therefore, harm to children can flow from the misuse of that authority.  Id. 
 361.  E.g., Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, A Public Role in the Private Family: The Parental 
Rights and Responsibilities Act and the Politics of Child Protection and Education, 57 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 393, 417 (1996) (“The idea that any public involvement in child protection, education, health 
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entity privacy paved the way for individual rights to be recognized within the 
family, including the rights of women and children to be free from family 
violence and harm.362 
This work of feminist theorists has had practical effect.  Breaking down 
the myth of a divide between the private family and that which is deemed 
public has served to better secure the individual rights of women and chil-
dren.  Highlighting the fallacies of the public/private divide has made way 
for intrusions into the purportedly private sphere of the family once deemed 
anathema.363  Domestic violence laws offer a prominent example of the ef-
fects of exposing the public/private divide as a mythical construct.  Domestic 
violence, once treated as a private family matter, now is a criminal act that 
can result in state prosecution.364  In addition, although child abuse laws pre-
date the work of feminist scholars, the notion that concepts of family privacy 
supersede the family’s right to be free from harm is furthered by feminists’ 
work regarding the falsehoods and fallacies of family entity privacy.365  One 
can question the state decision to intrude in a particular case of alleged child 
abuse and the interventions the state applies to address suspected child abuse, 
but the authority of the state to intervene in cases of suspected child abuse in 
general is not questioned on the basis of family privacy.366 
B.  How the Public Schools Have Privacy 
Taking these notions of privacy and the construct of the public/private 
divide and applying them to the public schools reveals the ways that the pub-
lic schools are private.  It therefore also demonstrates that the notion that 
                                                          
and income support must inevitably erode the powers and unity of the family is not new . . . .  The 
myth remains powerful that the allocation of rights and responsibilities among children and parents 
and the State is a zero sum game—with any gains for either children’s rights or the State’s interest 
coming at the expense of the traditional family.”). 
 362.  FINEMAN, supra note 10, at 21 (“[T]he autonomy of individuals within the family, for 
which feminists have fought by exposing domestic violence and child abuse . . . asks that their in-
terests be considered separately and protected even against other members of that family unit.”). 
 363.  See Dailey, supra note 10, at 1016–17 (“At the same time that family privacy preserves a 
loving refuge of individual freedom, it also shields domestic abuse and inequality from public re-
dress.  It was in recognition of this oppressive aspect of family privacy that the constitutional prin-
ciple of individual autonomy pierced the domestic sphere.”); supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 364.  Dailey, supra note 10, at 1016–17; see also AM. BAR ASS’N, COMM’N ON DOMESTIC & 
SERIAL VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ARREST POLICIES (2014), http://www.ameri-
canbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/domestic_violence1/Resources/statutorysummary-
charts/2014%20Domestic%20Violence%20Arrest%20Policy%20Chart.authcheckdam.pdf (sum-
marizing the domestic violence arrest laws in the fifty states and U.S. territories). 
 365.  While domestic violence laws and child abuse laws represent steps forward in protecting 
women and children from harm and exploitation, the systems are by no means free from problems.  
Domestic violence laws certainly do not protect all women and can be misused.  See supra note 180 
and accompanying text.  Child welfare systems suffer from endemic bias that affects low-income 
families and families of color.  See supra notes 145, 147 and accompanying text.  
 366.  See supra notes 145, 147 and accompanying text. 
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schools are strictly public is false, and so the public/private binary as it is 
considered with respect to public schools is also false.  Finally, recognizing 
this false binary in the context of the public schools unmasks the problems 
with it.  Most particularly, it reveals that children are vulnerable to harm in 
school. 
1.  Public Schools’ Privacy 
Public schools are private in both of the senses developed above.  First, 
the public schools enjoy entity privacy because their decisions regarding 
whether harm to children has occurred in school are largely unregulated.367  
Second, the public schools are private in the sense that they are responsible 
for caretaking tasks traditionally deemed domestic, or private. 
To have entity privacy, a discrete sphere must be free from regulations 
regarding some decisions or actions.368  Obviously, public schools are enti-
ties.  As such, public schools are discrete spheres, like families, within which 
decisions made could either be regulated or not.  In this way, they are at least 
theoretically capable of enjoying entity privacy.  To the extent the public 
schools’ decisions are unregulated, therefore, they enjoy entity privacy. 
As the foregoing discussion of schools’ absence of responsibility for 
harms to children in their care demonstrates, schools’ decisions that have an 
impact on harms to children are largely unregulated.  They, therefore, have 
entity privacy with respect to those decisions.  Admittedly, the courts do not 
say that the schools’ decisions impacting harms to children in school are pri-
vate, and therefore they will not hold them liable for the related, sometimes 
resulting, harm that happens to children.  Instead, the lack of regulation hap-
pens under the guise of pedagogical or disciplinary justifications for the 
harm, as in the case of T.W. or Domingo.369  It also happens because courts 
do not interfere with school decision-making as long as they do not do some-
thing clearly unreasonable in response to harms, as in student-on-student sex-
ual harassment cases.370  In addition, this lack of regulation is justified be-
cause the public schools lack direct knowledge of the harm, as in teacher-on-
student sexual harassment, and excuse their decisions to do nothing in re-
sponse to reasonable cause to suspect the harm.371  Finally, when bullying 
occurs to students, the lack of regulation into school decision-making hap-
pens for all those reasons and because children have no actionable rights to 
be free from bullying in school.372  No matter the stated reason, though, the 
                                                          
 367.  See supra Part III.B. 
 368.  See supra notes 324–344 and accompanying text. 
 369.  See supra notes 192–210 and accompanying text. 
 370.  See supra notes 214–233 and accompanying text. 
 371.  See supra notes 240–263 and accompanying text. 
 372.  See supra notes 265–290 and accompanying text. 
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effect is still the same.  Schools enjoy a lack of regulation and the privacy in 
these cases by way of a lack of interference with, and responsibility for, de-
cisions that affect whether a harm has occurred to a student in school. 
The second aspect of schools’ privacy centers on schools’ responsibility 
for caretaking tasks traditionally considered domestic and private.373  The Su-
preme Court has said that caretaking roles belong to the private family 
realm.374  Yet it has also identified public schools as having these same 
roles.375  As previously discussed, the public schools have a role in maintain-
ing the health and safety of children.376  They have a role in teaching them 
morals.377  So, the public schools have responsibility for these traditionally 
deemed domestic, or private, activities, and this responsibility reveals another 
dimension of their privacy.  The public schools then have a double layer of 
privacy.  Their entity privacy protects them from scrutiny over these private 
caretaking activities. 
One counterargument to the notion that the public schools enjoy entity 
privacy is that it simply overstates the matter.  To be sure, the public schools 
are very much regulated and, as such, are not private.  State legislatures have 
much control over the workings of the public schools, and Congress has 
hardly been hands-off in its approach to education policy.378  The Supreme 
Court also regulates schools when it accepts the call to decide the boundaries 
of student rights in relation to school authority.379  Yet while public schools 
operate under much regulation, they also have much discretion.  Indeed, even 
during the process of regulation through Supreme Court decisions, the Court 
acknowledges the discretion the schools have.380  In this discretion is privacy.  
                                                          
 373.  See supra notes 322–323, 331–332 and accompanying text. 
 374.  See supra notes 332–349 and accompanying text. 
 375.  See supra Part I.B. 
 376.  See supra notes 122–123 and accompanying text. 
 377.  See supra notes 102–104 and accompanying text. 
 378.  State legislatures regulate much of the workings of the public schools from their hours to 
their curriculum.  See supra note 39 and accompanying text.  Congress has passed comprehensive 
education laws governing student testing, achievement, and the education of students with disabili-
ties.  For example, the Every Student Succeeds Act requires that states accepting federal money for 
assistance educating disadvantaged students comply with certain evidenced-based curricular re-
quirements as well as review requirements.  20 U.S.C. § 6303 (2012).  Similarly, the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act requires states accepting federal assistance for the education of stu-
dents with disabilities to comply with a detailed scheme with annual written planning for the needs 
of each child with a disability as well as with specific comprehensive evaluation and disciplinary 
protections.  20 U.S.C. § 1411, 1414 (2012).  
 379.  See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 380.  For example, in Board. of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. 
Pico, the Supreme Court said, “[t]he Court has long recognized that local school boards have broad 
discretion in the management of school affairs” but also went on to say, “[a]t the same time, how-
ever, we have necessarily recognized that the discretion of the States and local school boards in 
matters of education must be exercised in a manner that comports with the transcendent imperatives 
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Just as the notion that families have some degree of privacy does not negate 
their regulation and thus public nature, the regulation of schools does not 
negate their concomitant lack of regulation and entity privacy.381 
Another critique of the argument that the public schools are private is 
that individual privacy and family entity privacy is identified explicitly in 
doctrine, but no doctrine has yet explicitly called the public schools “pri-
vate.”382  This critique, however, elevates form over function.  That courts do 
not specifically call the public schools private does not mean that they are not 
imbued with the features of privacy.  No doctrine calls families public, but 
they nonetheless are highly regulated.383  Similarly, where the public schools 
have discretion and are unregulated, they have privacy. 
A third possible critique is that although schools may do some of the 
kinds of caretaking that families do, families ultimately bear the most respon-
sibility for the care of children.384  So, any caretaking that schools do consti-
tutes too little of the overall proportion of caretaking to make them private.  
While it is true that families do more caretaking than schools, schools still do 
caretaking.  They therefore are still doing work traditionally deemed to be 
within the private realm of the family.385 
2.  The Problems with Public Schools’ Privacy 
As is the case with family entity privacy, public school entity privacy is 
problematic.  First, because schools are state entities, the limits to public 
school liability mean that the state entity, as compared to the non-state entity, 
has more privacy with respect to decisions affecting harms to children.  Fam-
ilies will more easily face intrusion into or regulation of their decision-mak-
ing that affects whether children are harmed than will the public schools.386  
Family entity privacy has been broken down, then, in a way that public school 
entity privacy has not. Public school entity privacy thus inverts perceived 
norms about the relative privacy of the family as compared to the state.387 
                                                          
of the First Amendment.”  457 U.S. 853, 863–64 (1982).  As a result, the Court invalidated the 
decision of the school board in question to ban certain books from its libraries.  Id. at 875. 
 381.  As Frances Olsen noted, though focusing primarily on that deemed private, “all private 
action can be made to look public and vice versa.”  Olsen, supra note 10, at 322. 
 382.  Entity privacy, however, is not called “entity” privacy by the Court.  It is just “privacy.”  
E.g., supra notes 329–330 and accompanying text.  And, while the Supreme Court has identified 
caretaking roles for the public schools of the sort traditionally deemed domestic and private, it has 
never called those roles of the schools private.  See supra notes 321–322, 330–331 and accompany-
ing text; supra Section III.B. 
 383.  See supra notes 345–353 and accompanying text. 
 384.  See infra note 405 and accompanying text. 
 385.  See supra notes 322–323, 331–332 and accompanying text. 
 386.  See supra notes 303–336 and accompanying text. 
 387.  See supra notes 15–19 and accompanying text. 
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Second, public schools’ privacy subordinates the individual rights of 
children to the privacy of the entity—the public schools.  It reinforces the 
principle that the public schools need discretion, or to be unregulated and 
private, with respect to the decisions of the school about pedagogy or the 
proper ways to respond to harms to children over the children themselves.  
Moreover, it does so at times to such a degree that it undermines schools’ 
own roles and responsibilities.  For example, when children are so harmed in 
school that they miss significant amounts of school or drop out entirely, but 
schools have made only half-hearted attempts to address or prevent the harm, 
public schools’ entity privacy shields them from responsibility for not ful-
filling their educational and caretaking roles.388  Public schools’ entity pri-
vacy not only protects their private caretaking decisions, as noted earlier, but 
it also allows schools to abandon them entirely with little or no liability.389 
IV.  PIERCING PUBLIC SCHOOLS’ PRIVACY 
Public schools can, therefore, evade responsibility for harms to children 
in a variety of ways depending on the claim and even when such evasion 
undermines their very roles and responsibilities.390  That raises a question 
about whether some alternative claim could be developed and recognized by 
courts that would work better to protect students.  The recognition of schools’ 
privacy, particularly their caretaking functions, offers a way to develop such 
a claim.  It provides a theoretical basis for the development under the Four-
teenth Amendment of an affirmative duty of schools to protect children from 
harm and children’s right to be free from it.  Thus, it provides a justification 
for imposing responsibility on public schools for harms to children in their 
care and rebalances the relationship between the privacy of schools and the 
rights of children, such that those rights are not subordinate.  Just as recog-
nizing the false construct of family privacy created an avenue for ending the 
subordination of the individual rights of women and children to be free from 
family violence, so too can recognition of the false construct of the public 
schools as fully public pave the way for recognizing children’s rights in 
schools. 
                                                          
 388.  E.g., Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting the Morrow sisters withdrew 
from public school and transferred to a private school as a result of the abuse they suffered); T.W. 
ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole Cty., 610 F.3d 588 (11th Cir. 2010) (explaining T.W. dropped 
out of school as a result of his abuse). 
 389.  See supra Part III.B.1. 
 390.  See supra Part III. 
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A.  Dismantling the Public/Private Divide to Give Schools a Duty to 
Protect and Children a Right to Be Free from Harm 
Courts have long rejected the argument that the public schools have a 
duty to protect children under the Fourteenth Amendment, although not al-
ways without reservation.391  The argument in support of the duty has been 
grounded in an analogy between mandatory school attendance laws and state 
confinement of adults in prisons and mental health facilities, where a state 
duty to protect has been recognized because of the special relationship be-
tween the state and the confined individuals.392  Although these arguments 
have not found success in the school context, recognition of the relevance of 
public schools’ caretaking roles in the Fourteenth Amendment context offers 
a new way to approach the claim and supports both a duty on the part of 
schools to protect students and their corollary right to it.393 
In the school context, courts have rested their consistent refusal to find 
that schools have a Fourteenth Amendment duty to protect students on their 
readings of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Estelle v. Gamble394 and Young-
berg v. Romeo,395 where the Court found an affirmative state duty to protect 
prisoners and involuntarily institutionalized persons, and Deshaney v. Win-
negabo County Department of Social Services,396 where the Court found no 
duty on the part of the state to protect an individual from acts of private citi-
zens.397  In the former cases, the Supreme Court found the state had a special 
relationship with the individuals giving rise to a duty to protect them because 
                                                          
 391.  For example, in T.K. v. New York City Department of Education, the federal district court 
in New York considered the duty to protect argument in the bullying context.  779 F. Supp. 2d 289, 
308 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).  Despite federal court decisions finding no such duty, it nonetheless said, 
It is uncertain whether under the Due Process Clause, a public school has the duty to 
protect an elementary school student from bullying where truancy laws are in effect.  This 
question need not be answered now since students have a right to be secure in school and 
schools have a duty to prevent students from harassment under IDEA and Title IX. 
Id. 
 392.  See supra note 274 and accompanying text. 
 393.  At least seven federal courts of appeals have come to this conclusion.  Patel v. Kent Sch. 
Dist., 648 F.3d 965, 973 (9th Cir. 2011) (concluding that a school had no duty to protect a student 
with developmental disabilities from sexual encounters with another student in a bathroom, the 
Court noted “[a]t least seven circuits have held that compulsory school attendance alone is insuffi-
cient to invoke the special-relationship” doctrine giving rise to a duty to protect).  The courts specify 
whether the duty to protect is a duty against harms from third parties or school staff to varying 
degrees.  Sometimes it is both, as in Graham v. Independent School District No. I-89, where the 
allegation included that the school had a duty to protect under the Fourteenth Amendment against 
actions of school staff and third parties.  22 F.3d 991, 993 (10th Cir. 1994). 
 394.  429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
 395.  457 U.S. 307 (1982). 
 396.  489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
 397.  Id. at 195. 
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the state had restrained the liberty of the prisoners and institutionalized per-
sons.398  In DeShaney, the court found no liberty restraint and, therefore, no 
state duty to protect the individual—in that case, a child.399  Cases applying 
these decisions in the school context have found that schools lack custody of 
students—that is, they have not restrained them—and therefore have no spe-
cial relationship with the students giving rise to a duty to protect them.400 
The case of D.R. ex rel. L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical 
School401 is representative of these decisions.402  In that case, female students 
brought an action against their school and the Penn Ridge, Pennsylvania 
School District alleging a Fourteenth Amendment violation because fellow 
students in a graphic arts class had repeatedly sexually, physically, and ver-
bally assaulted them over a period of several months.403  In denying their 
claims, the Third Circuit found the school did not have a special relationship 
with the children, and therefore no duty existed under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to protect them from the harms they suffered.404  It outlined the meaning 
of special relationship as one of physical restraint or custody.405  It went even 
further and said that the “state’s duty to prisoners and involuntarily commit-
ted patients exists because of the full time severe and continuous state re-
striction of liberty in both environments.”406  While mandatory attendance 
laws require children to attend schools, the court reasoned that they can at-
                                                          
 398.  See supra notes 274, 277. 
 399.  DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200–01.  DeShaney involved the case of a young boy who was 
severely beaten by his father while in his custody, and the state, though aware of a history of abuse 
by the father, did not protect him from that abuse.  Id. at 191–93.  In deciding the state had no 
Fourteenth Amendment duty to protect the child, the Supreme Court said: 
[I]t is the State’s affirmative act of restraining the individual’s freedom to act on his own 
behalf—through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal 
liberty—which is the “deprivation of liberty” triggering the protections of the Due Pro-
cess Clause, not its failure to act to protect his liberty interests against harms inflicted by 
other means. 
Id. at 200. 
 400.  See supra note 393 and accompanying text.  
 401.  972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992).   
 402.  Id.  The dissent in Middle Bucks strongly denounced the majority’s conclusion regarding 
the Fourteenth Amendment duty to protect and its rationale, stating: 
The majority’s restrictive view of the “special relationship” . . . is particularly troubling, 
not only because it is based on the erroneous premise that its decision is compelled by 
precedent but also because it is so sweeping that it is unlikely that any state-imposed 
restraint of personal liberty short of incarceration or involuntary commitment will trigger 
the duty to protect. 
Id. at 1383 (Sloviter, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 1367 (majority opinion)). 
 403.  Id. at 1366. 
 404.  Id. at 1372.  
 405.  Id. at 1370–71. 
 406.  Id. at 1371. 
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tend other schools, such as private schools, and so there is no physical cus-
tody—full time or otherwise.407  Thus, the public schools have not suffi-
ciently restrained, or taken custody of, children to give rise to a duty to protect 
them. 
However, Middle Bucks and similarly decided cases fail for at least two 
reasons.  First, their conception of state restraint, or custody, belies the reality 
and nuance of schools’ relationships with students.  Because of mandatory 
attendance laws, students in school fall somewhere in the middle of the spec-
trum on which Estelle-Youngberg and DeShaney exist.408  To be sure, they 
are not so fully restrained that they never leave the school setting, as is the 
case with prisoners and institutionalized persons.  They also, though, are not 
fully able to forego school; the idea of school shopping is simply not a real-
istic option for the majority of students in public schools.409  As the dissent 
in Middle Bucks points out, the “compulsory nature of public school attend-
ance is not lessened by the fact that a few fortunate students have the option 
to attend private school or be educated at home.”410 
Second, and relatedly, these cases ignore the balancing test in the 
Youngberg decision and the relevance of schools’ private, caretaking func-
tions to that test.411  In deciding that the state owes a duty of care to involun-
tarily institutionalized persons, Youngberg declared that the state “may not 
restrain residents except when and to the extent professional judgment deems 
this necessary to assure such safety.”412  In other words, the Court concluded, 
“that the nature of the restrictions on an individual’s liberty bear some rela-
tion to the State’s asserted purpose for restraining his liberty” and must be 
balanced against it.413 
In the school context, courts have not engaged with the idea that 
schools’ authority must be balanced against obligations arising from the 
state’s purpose for restraining them by requiring students to go to school.414  
In failing to do so, they have also failed to acknowledge schools’ caretaking 
                                                          
 407.  Id. 
 408.  Table 5.1, supra note 39; see also Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1383 (Sloviter, J., dissenting) 
(stating “[t]here is no doubt that this case falls between DeShaney and Estelle/Youngberg”). 
 409.  The majority of students in public school come from low-income families, who cannot 
afford to send their children to private schools or to homeschool them.  S. EDUC. FOUND., 
RESEARCH BULLETIN, A NEW MAJORITY: LOW INCOME STUDENTS NOW A MAJORITY IN THE 
NATION’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 2 (2015), http://www.southerneducation.org/getattachment/4ac62e27-
5260-47a5-9d02-14896ec3a531/A-New-Majority-2015-Update-Low-Income-Students-Now.aspx.  
 410.  Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1380 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). 
 411.  See Note, A Right to Learn? Improving Educational Outcomes Through Substantive Due 
Process, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1323, 1335–37 (2007) [hereinafter Right to Learn?]. 
 412.  Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982).  
 413.  See Right to Learn?, supra note 411, at 1337. 
 414.  See supra Part I.B. 
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roles in the context of considering schools’ duties to students under the Four-
teenth Amendment.415  The purpose of schools is to, among other things, ed-
ucate students, teach them morals and behavioral norms, and guard their 
safety in certain ways.416  If the public schools are not carrying out those 
tasks, then they have restrained students’ liberty to no end and violated their 
Fourteenth Amendment rights.417  When requiring students to attend school, 
therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment imposes at least a limited duty on 
schools to protect against such harms that undermine these purposes.  Pro-
tecting children in this way is also caretaking work.  So, when a school fails 
to protect students from harms that undermine their other caretaking work, 
such as teaching students behavioral norms or guarding their health, then they 
have violated the Fourteenth Amendment.418 
The right of children to be free from harm should be a corollary to a 
schools’ duty to protect children.  If schools have a duty to protect children 
from harms that undermine the purposes of school, then children should have 
a right to be free from those harms in school as well.  They have the right to 
at least the most elemental form of protection: freedom from harm. 
The development of this duty and this right can be critiqued in at least 
two ways.  First, it can be argued that the state’s role in requiring students to 
attend school does not change the legal relationship between the school and 
the students into a formal custodial relationship.  While legal custody does 
remain with the parent when children are in school, this critique ignores that 
some form of physical custody—a limited form but one that nonetheless 
gives rise to some duties—occurs when the state requires students to go to 
school.  Indeed, parents cannot assert full control over their children while 
they are in school, as evidenced by, for example, school policies that limit 
parents’ ability to physically access their children in school.419  When par-
ents’ access is limited, their control and custody is changed in a very real, 
                                                          
 415.  Although, the Supreme Court has recognized these purposes in the context of affording 
schools deference to suppress students’ rights under the First and Fourth Amendments.  See supra 
Part I.B. 
 416.  See supra Part I.B. 
 417.  An analogous argument has been made in the context of students’ right to an education 
more generally.  See Right to Learn?, supra note 411, at 1337.  There, the argument was “if a state 
restricts an individual’s liberty for the express purpose of educating that individual and then fails to 
educate her, then the nature of the restraint bears no reasonable relation to the purpose of the re-
straint, and due process is violated.”  Id.  Here, the argument is that schools’ duty to protect is 
triggered not by a substantively inadequate education but by the schools’ failure to protect from 
harms suffered in school that substantially harm or totally deprive children of the benefits of school.  
These benefits include the caretaking work schools do in teaching students morals, instilling behav-
ioral norms, and guarding their health and safety.  When schools fail to protect children in those 
ways, then they have restrained their liberty without much, or any, purpose.   
 418.  See supra Part I.B. 
 419.  For example, in California, parental visits to school must be coordinated through the school 
principal.  CAL. SCH. BDS. ASS’N, CSBA SAMPLE BOARD POLICY: VISITORS/OUTSIDERS (2012), 
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practical way.  Those changes, therefore, create obligations on the part of the 
school to pick up the mantle of those limitations on custody. 
Second, establishing both a duty to protect on the part of public schools 
and the right of children to be free from harm in school may seem superflu-
ous.  Establishing the duty to protect alone might seem sufficient to give chil-
dren an avenue for holding schools responsible on an institutional level when 
harms occur in schools.  However, if schools have a duty to protect children, 
but children have no right to be free from harm, then the focus of any analysis 
of harm to children in school will fail to focus on the children.  In the current 
analysis of any claim a child might bring against the school, the rights of 
children are subordinate.420  Recognizing children’s rights more fully effects 
the rebalancing between school entity privacy and children’s rights than 
simply recognizing a duty of schools to protect children on its own would do. 
B.  A Framework for Analyzing the Duty and the Right 
Arguing for courts to recognize a Fourteenth Amendment duty on the 
part of public schools to protect children from harm and children’s right to 
be free of it is one thing.  Applying it is another matter.  The application 
requires a framework for analysis.  That framework must start with the ques-
tion of what the duty entails and the degrees of harm from which children 
have a right to be free.  Distinguishing the parental duty to protect their chil-
dren from the “duty to protect” students during school is imperative.421  As 
noted earlier, students in school fall into a relationship with the state that is 
between that of children in the care of their parents and that of the inmates 
and institutionalized persons in Estelle/Youngberg.422  As such, the schools’ 




SchoolEnv/SchoolSafetySampleBoardPolicies/AR1250VisitorsOutsiders.ashx.  Similarly, in 
Texas, the Texas Education Agency states, “[t]here is no express right to visit a school.”  Tex. Educ. 
Agency, General Inquiry–General Questions FAQ, 
http://tea.texas.gov/About_TEA/Contact_Us/General_Inquiry/General_Inquiry_-
_General_Questions_FAQ/#visit.  
 420.  See supra Part IV.B.2. 
 421.  The family’s duty to protect its children has long been recognized.  For example, in State 
v. Williquette, the Wisconsin Supreme Court explained this duty and its source.  385 N.W.2d 145 
(Wis. 1986).  In Williquette, a mother challenged charges of child abuse because she did not commit 
the abuse.  Id. at 148.  The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that persons who knowingly permit 
the abuse of their children can be charged with child abuse.  Id. at 147.  To support this conclusion, 
the court discussed the legal duty of parents to protect their children stating: “It is the right and duty 
of parents . . . to protect their children, to care for them in sickness and in health, and to do whatever 
may be necessary for their care, maintenance, and preservation.”  Id. at 152 (quoting Cole v. Sears 
Roebuck & Co., 177 N.W. 2d 866, 869 (Wis. 1970)). 
 422.  D.R. ex rel. L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Tech. Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1384 (3d 
Cir. 1992) (Sloviter, J., dissenting).  Moreover, parental duty is fraught with complications, as it has 
been enforced more with respect to women of color and low-income women than others.  Michele 
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duty to protect should be lesser than that of parents or the state when it com-
pletely restricts the liberty of prisoners and institutionalized persons.  It 
should be a duty to protect students while they are in school.  Of course, 
schools would have no obligation to protect students from, for example, 
harms attendant to playing in the backyards of their homes. 
In addition, this duty to protect is not against any and every harm a child 
might suffer in school.  As the Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged, 
the Fourteenth Amendment is not a “font of tort law.”423  Schools must pro-
tect students from significant harm, as opposed to lesser degrees of harm, to 
prevent turning the Fourteenth Amendment into a font of tort law.  Signifi-
cant harm means harm more than the kinds of unintentional harm generally 
attendant to school attendance.  It means harm that deprives students of the 
purpose for attending school—the kind of harm that results from intentional 
or reckless acts, which cause more suffering than would result from the harms 
generally attendant to school attendance.  So, the harms in the case of T.W., 
for example, which included the exacerbation of disabilities and the develop-
ment of new disabilities, would meet this standard.424  None of those harms 
are of the sort that would be expected due to school attendance.  They devel-
oped from intentional acts on the part of T.W.’s teacher.425  By contrast, in 
Domingo, the teacher pinched the student’s cheeks.  While doing so was in-
tentional, that harm alone would not satisfy this standard if it only amounted 
to bruising, which is the sort of harm that occurs in school regularly.426 
In order to trigger the duty or to violate the rights of children, students 
not only have to be in school, but schools also have to have knowledge the 
harm is happening.  More specifically, to trigger the duty, they must have a 
reasonable cause to suspect the harm.  It need not be direct knowledge.  The 
kinds of reports of harassment in Bostic v. Smyrna School District, for exam-
ple, would suffice.427  There, the principal knew that the teacher, Smith, and 
student, Bostic, were seen standing so close together in the school hallway 
that it gave rise to suspicions about their relationship.428  The principal also 
                                                          
Estrin Gilman, The Poverty Defense, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 495, 513–16 (2013).  As such, it serves 
as neither an ideal model nor a standard by which to develop a school duty to protect students under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  Dorothy E. Roberts, Prison, Foster Care, and the Systemic Punishment 
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 423.  Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 476–77 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Paul v. 
Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)). 
 424.  See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
 425.  Not only were the harms imposed on T.W. intentional, they reflected a possible sadistic 
disorder.  T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole Cty., 610 F.3d 588, 597 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 426.  See supra note 207 and accompanying text. 
 427.  418 F.3d 355, 357–58 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 428.  Id. 
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knew that Smith’s wife had found them alone together in her classroom, caus-
ing Smith’s wife to question the nature of their relationship.429  Such 
knowledge gives rise to a reasonable cause to suspect harm might be happen-
ing to a child. 
Finally, if schools act reasonably in response to notice of the harm, then 
they will have complied with the duty and will not have violated children’s 
rights.  A reasonable response would be one calculated to address the cause 
of the harm so that it will not continue.  It need not be a perfect response.  
This standard recognizes, therefore, that not all significant harm to children 
can be prevented.  So, if the school district in Bostic had removed the teacher 
from any contact with the child and reported her to police for further investi-
gation of the harassment reports, but the harassment continued, the school 
would not be held liable.430  In that case, the public school would have taken 
the steps possible to end the harassment. 
Recognizing a duty of public schools to protect students from harm and 
their right to be free from it will, even under the framework outlined here, 
likely result in schools facing more liability for harms to children in their 
care.  This framework, however, seeks to allay at least some concerns at-
tendant to such increases in liability by both using familiar touchstones such 
as severe harm and notice and giving them depth by defining their meaning 
in this context.  Still, under this framework, schools will face more liability.  
It will be, though, to the worthwhile end of reducing children’s vulnerability 
to harm in school and privileging their rights over school privacy. 
In sum, the schools should have a duty to protect against harm, meaning 
significant harm, to children in school, and children have a right to be free 
from harm.  For schools to be liable for breaching their duty and violating 
children’s rights in this context, the school must have knowledge of the harm, 
or reasonable basis for suspecting the harm is happening.  In addition, schools 
must take reasonable steps to end the harm. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Just as exposing family privacy as a false construct was necessary for 
the individual rights of women and children to gain protection within that 
institution, so too does the privacy of the public schools need to be recognized 
for children to be better protected from harm there.  This Article has at-
tempted to set forth ways in which the public schools enjoy privacy.  Specif-
ically, it has argued that because public schools’ decisions regarding harm to 
children in school are largely unregulated, this lack of regulation makes 
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schools private.431  They also are private in that they do caretaking, which is 
work traditionally deemed domestic, or private.432  Finally, this Article con-
tends that schools are more private than the family because families can more 
easily be held responsible than public schools for harm to children in their 
care.433  This privacy of the public schools not only exists, but it also privi-
leges school authority over student rights—at times to the point of undermin-
ing the very purpose of school.434 
Recognizing this privacy, particularly by understanding caretaking of 
children as an element of it, however, also supports a theoretical argument 
for a Fourteenth Amendment duty of public schools to protect children from 
harm, and students’ corollary right to be free from harm in school.435  Estab-
lishing this duty and corollary right would accomplish multiple ends.  It 
would shift the balance in the current evaluation of children’s claims against 
schools for harms suffered.436  It would also prioritize the rights of children, 
so they are not subordinated to the privacy of the public schools.437 
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